Chemophobia and radiophobia's shared cultural roots

Chemist Michelle Francl has a quite interesting critique of the all-too-common "bobo" conceit of chemophobia - in its distilled form, a variant of the "appeal to nature" fallacy (sometimes mistakenly referred to as the "naturalistic fallacy"). Faced with the unfamiliar (and sometimes unpronounceable) chemical names for even mundane medicines like naproxen (more commonly known under its trade name "Aleve"), they sound menacing and unfamiliar - despite the fact that naproxen is fundamentally similar to salicylic acid on a chemical level - an extract of willow bark (and a metabolite of the more common compound known by the humble name of "aspirin"). As a result, a booming cottage industry exists for peddlers of "natural" remedies - with the implication that "natural" means "safer." (In the end, chemistry doesn't really care whether it comes from a lab or nature - the laws of physics remain the same regardless).

An important consequence of chemophobia is that it trades established science for an unknown - "traditional" alternative remedies which may or may not be effective and which fall outside the rigorous quality, safety, and perhaps most important dose controls applied to pharmaceuticals. But the one thing that it doesn't escape from is chemistry itself - for these "natural" remedies to be effective, they rely upon the same chemical principles in modern medicines. Hence, the chemophobia fallacy.

Francl's discussion of chemophobia (of which the whole thing is very much worth reading) touches upon an important parallel common to discussions of nuclear technology - radiophobia:

We are a chemophobic culture. Chemical has become a synonym for something artificial, adulterated, hazardous, or toxic. Chemicals are bad—for you, for your children, for the environment. But whatever chemophobics would like to think, there is no avoiding chemicals, no way to create chemical-free zones. Absolutely everything is made of atoms and molecules; it’s all chemistry.

The problems of chemophobia and radiophobia share common cultural cognition roots - particularly a mistrust arising from the origin of perceived risks. Sources of risk from large, faceless corporations, from synthetic origins are unfamiliar or ill-understood conspire to increase perceived risk, particularly for more those who identify with more egalitarian / communitarian values. (By contrast, as Francl notes, more natural, friendly-sounding names - think extract of willow - by virtue of their familiarity sound less threatening - again, despite the fact that the chemistry is unchanged.)

The same is true for things like radon gas - despite frequent concerns about radiation exposure from nuclear power plants, individuals are far less likely to be concerned about far more common (and far larger) exposures from naturally-occurring radon gas in their own basements resulting from the decay of uranium byproducts found in uranium-rich soils. More importantly, the largest source of increasing radiation exposure in modern times has been due to medical imaging - the increasing proliferation of regular CT scans is far higher contributor to the average American's radiation exposure compared to nuclear energy facilities. (ANS has a very useful tool for estimating your average exposure based on these kinds of lifestyle factors.)

The consequences of irrational fear go beyond the consequences for the pharmaceutical and energy industries - the choice to eschew science-based medicine carries real risks for health and safety. Fear of radiation results in energy choices like coal (particularly in Germany, which has swapped coal for the nuclear plants which it has sought to shut down) which produce far more deaths per kilowatt-hour both by fine particulates and which incidentally release more radiation than the nuclear plants they seek to avoid. The desire for "natural," intermittent energy sources (like wind and solar) in turn lead to far higher consumption of natural gas to fill the gaps in their intermittency, again amplifying the far greater risks of global warming. (And, as +Rod Adams recently notes, overly conservative emergency evacuation protocols can in fact increase latent cancers in the event of a nuclear emergency - namely by contributing to increased traffic congestion, preventing the needed triage to evacuate those facing the greatest exposure).

Francl concludes with an astute observation of a common goal, which should not itself be to dictate choices concerning how risks of various alternatives (both in medicine and energy) are weighed, but to ensure that those risks are discussed and decided based upon sound information about those risks, rather than falling prey to cultural biases. Chemistry, like energy, is an indispensable component of the modern world, and both face the same communication challenge of fostering a science-based public discussion based on a rational evaluation of comparative risks and benefits. This in turn means understanding how cultural biases are formed - and ultimately developing science communication strategies to break through these biases. (In this regard, I once again point to folks like +Dan Kahan of the Yale Cultural Cognition project, who is doing the yeoman's work with this topic as well as David Ropeik, who writes about risk perception issues extensively in an approachable fashion.)

I will say as a postscript that I think all too often that there is a particular intellectual laziness which resists these kinds of strategies - which (at least in the case of nuclear energy) solely blames public (mis-)perception of risks on petroleum-fueled conspiracies. Aside from being devoid of evidence whenever challenged, such excuses (and they are excuses) unproductively halt any discussion of what to do about the issue (and further, fail to recognize the deeper cognitive science behind how risk perceptions are formed. For example, cultural polarization occurs even for novel technologies like nanotechnology after exposure to limited information about the technology.)

Obviously, there exists no doubt that there's money to be made preying on fear (both in the realm of alternative "energy" and "medicine"), but the fact is that these is more than sufficient evidence that how risk perceptions are formed has far more to do with our inherent values and cultural affiliations than the stock price of Exxon-Mobil. Thus, for these kinds of science-informed discussions to occur, it also requires nuclear professionals to stop hiding behind convenient, ephemeral excuses of conspiracies and actually begin understanding the science of how risks are perceived (and likewise, the science of risk communication).

Scientagonism: The problem of antagonistic science communication

A recent column by Daniel Sarewitz in Nature on bridging the "partisan divide" with respect to public perception of science inspired some spirited debate over on my twitter feed yesterday. The short version goes something like this: scientists are often perceived as being in the thrall of Democrats, exposing the greater scientific enterprise to being undermined as simply another partisan front (or, alternatively factionalizing, wherein partisan camps each bring in their own "experts" an accuse the other side of "junk science). None of this is helped by scientists who go out of their way to bring on their antagonism - see, for example, the letter signed by 68 Nobel laureates endorsing President Obama over Mitt Romney in the last election (in which Sarewitz notes that of the 68, 43 have a record of public donations to candidates, and of these, only five have ever donated to Republican candidates, and none in the last election cycle). It goes without saying that, well-meaning as it may be, openly partisan activities like this aren't helping with the whole "not being perceived as a lockstep Democratic constituency" thing. (Note that I am explicitly not advocating mass abdication of scientists from the political discourse, which a genuinely terrible idea - but rather, a caution that lending one's scientific credibility to openly partisan ventures may not be in the best strategic interests of science...)

Sarewitz recommends bringing together scientists with less monolithic political views together to demonstrate overall scientific consensus on key issues such as global climate change and the like, along with ensuring greater ideological balance in high-profile scientific advisory panels. The overall of goal of such an enterprise would be in restoring a public perception of science as a bipartisan enterprise - and in particular, inoculating policies based on scientific recommendations as simply being based upon "partisan science" - or to use a favorite expression - bringing in the "dueling PhD's." Unfortunately, while Sarewitz correctly diagnoses the problem, his solution falls far short.

The deeper problem here antagonism - both perceived and real. Dan Kahan (of the Yale Cultural Cognition Project) has prolifically written about the issue of "Cultural Cognition" - in other words, how our individual values can (unconsciously) conspire to shape perceptions of risk to accommodate our pre-existing worldviews (something I've discussed prior in how this relates to public perception of risk and nuclear energy) - also known as motivated reasoning. In essence, the mind rebels against cognitive dissonance and will do what it takes to ensure such is resolved - namely by shaping our perceptions to confirm previously-held beliefs. Ideology, as it turns out, is an extremely effective marker for predicting risk perception - and more distressingly, these differences in perception grow more pronounced with "high-information" individuals, strongly pointing to the existence of motivated reasoning.

So what does all of this have to do with antagonism? Quite simply: everything. People will by nature rebel against information perceived to be antagonistic to their worldviews - downplaying evidence of phenomena that threatens their worldviews. (Kahan notes how this cuts several ways - both in how the threat of global climate change threatens market-oriented views of individualists and hierachists, and how the associations of nuclear power with "big business" and highly concentrated capital raises the hackles of those of more egalitarian and communitarian mindsets.) These associations are particularly acute when said scientific issues are charged with a single solution - such as in the case of climate, direct government intervention into the economy to regulate carbon dioxide emissions.

One of the more interesting outcomes of some of Kahan's experimental work has been in strategies toward de-polarization - science communication strategies which seek to minimize these perception gaps, namely by presenting scientific information in a way which seeks to minimize antagonism toward deeply-held values.  An example of this depolarization with respect to climate change is of course nuclear energy (along with geo-engineering); when communication of climate risks is presented with policy prescriptions of increased use of nuclear energy or new technologies such as geoengineering, individuals oriented toward skepticism of climate risks become more receptive - in other words, the use of framing has a demonstrable de-polarizing effect. Why? Namely because the science is now presented in a context where it is no longer threatening to the worldview of the listener.

And yet too often in science communication (and at times among nuclear advocates as well) there is the very opposite at work - science is presented as antagonistically as possible to the audience - as if somehow dismissing climate skeptics and religious fundamentalists as stupid and venal will cow them into belief. (Once again, to my horror I have seen the same phenomenon at work in certain discussions over nuclear energy - where those representing the house will shout down any who dare trespass in their domain instead of making any attempt at reasonable engagement.)

The same goes as well for the policies that from the science - absolutist arguments that inherently tie science to one favored set of policies - rather than a panoply of potential solutions. Such strategies are practically an open invitation to partisanship and motivated reasoning, and yet all too often are the standard for how high-profile science communication on controversial issues gets done. (Similarly, attempts to reconcile the idea of science as not being fundamentally incompatible or at odds with various political and religious values are frequently dismissed as at best naive and at worst "selling out" science.) It is in these cases where members of the scientific community in fact become their own worst enemies - namely in hardening an opposition predicated on the idea that certain scientific findings are fundamentally antagonistic to their values (and thus we return to the realm of "dueling PhD's...")

To put it on a meta level for a moment - getting the public to accept the scientific process as a means of understanding the natural world is in essence getting them to agree upon a common source for facts. But the role of science communication is not and should not be a platform for antagonizing whatever misguided metaphysical or theological beliefs the speaker believes the audience has. In other words, science can and should speak to facts and leave issues of metaphysics to others. (Or, to put it yet another way as I did on Twitter - is your goal to change beliefs over scientific facts or religious theology?)

This problem of "dueling PhD's" - or to put it another way, competing certifications on science, and in turn what experts we trust inherently come back to these kinds of issues. Kahan recently posted an interesting four-part essay (drawing heavily on the ideas of Karl Popper) on the notion of a "Liberal Republic of Science" (I, II, III, IV) - discussing how a key issue which arises even in societies which broadly accept science as a foundation of knowledge is in the inevitable conflicts of how we certify these sources of facts - in other words, the dueling PhDs. (Kahan stresses that in his view, much of the current wrangling over hot-button issues like climate, nuclear power, and vaccines is not even a question of who accepts science as a source of knowledge as it is the process of how our values shape whose information we certify as credible - which again, comes back to how this information validates existing value systems. Kahan's argument is thus for a science of science communication.) Ultimately this once again returns to the issue of antagonism - science presented in a way which is directly antagonistic to the values of the listener will be stripped of credibility in favor of information from sources which does not antagonize values. (Thus we get to Kahan's argument for a science of science communication - determining the best means of ensuring the best and most accurate scientific information is received and accepted by the overall public.)

Growing a consensus on science as a source of knowledge (or further, developing a common understanding on the same core set of scientific facts) does not imply unanimity in policy ends (and nor should it!), namely because policy is inherently a normative process. More importantly, dropping an explicitly antagonistic communication strategy in favor of one more easily accommodating to diverse values doesn't it in any way imply "giving in" or "selling out" science (as my position has been rather uncharitably characterized). Above all else, the goal here is to get people recognize a common starting point for facts, and letting the implications - both policy and metaphysical - flow from this common starting point. Getting people to agree to the reality of climate change does not imply unanimity about what to do about it, namely because this inherently involves value judgments over the required trade-offs - and of course the same is true for nuclear energy as well. What it does do however is to ensure a more honest, reasoned, and productive discussion of the available options.

Again, however - this requires a strategy for science communication that inherently puts aside antagonism and focuses upon compatibility with existing values. Two recent posts - one by +Suzanne Hobbs Baker at the ANS Nuclear Cafe and one by +Rod Adams at Atomic Insights fit well into what I'm proposing. Both discuss the role of communicating the value of nuclear energy as a strategy for combating climate change - Suzy within the context of framing nuclear as an ally of environmentalism in the face of climate change, and Rod in regards to how because discussions of climate are often so charged even within pro-nuclear communities that such debates become toxic (and thus are often placed strictly off-limits), thus depriving the nuclear community of a key message in communicating with the public. Both of them are focusing on how presenting nuclear as explicitly compatible with concerns with the environment can perhaps help to potentially forge partnerships from communities skeptical (and even at times adversarial) to one another. (And again, to emphasize - a deep concern over how to rectify doing something about climate change while maintaining our present standard of living is one of the fundamental reasons I decided to change careers...)

This is something that I myself have tried to embrace myself when dealing with audiences hostile to nuclear (such as the NNSA hearing on disposing of surplus weapons plutonium in MOX fuel in Chattanooga, back in September). The very first thing I acknowledged to the audience is that we clearly have disparate opinions about nuclear energy (ones unlikely to be resolved in the span of a single evening) but that everyone in the room shared common concerns over peace and security - our preferred means of achieving this ("...to MOX or not to MOX, that is the question...") simply differed. I'm not so fantastically egotistical as to believe this changed the entire tone of the meeting (there were still certainly rancorous and loud comments by the opposition), but I do sincerely believe starting from a position of common values and as much as possible eschewing antagonism helped to provoke thoughtful discussions which occurred afterwards (and at least some civility during).

None of this implies stepping down antagonism in science communication is a magic-bullet or a panacea, nor will it necessarily work in all cases (such as dealing with perhaps the most hardened zealots - be they of the anti-nuclear or fundamentalist variety...) But what it can do (in fact, what folks like Kahan have explicitly demonstrated when it comes to "compatabalist" communication strategies), is that it can help to detoxify these kinds of discussions, namely by pulling people away from the brink by not threatening their deeper values. That in itself would be progress.

Risk communication with a tin ear

Quite serendipitously, around the time of my prior post looking at how the public perceives risk when it comes to nuclear energy, two interesting pieces appeared around the same time which serve to reinforce some of the points I had made. (I've been somewhat remiss in getting them only until now, mostly due to both a recent conference and now travel.)

The first, "Risk, Fear, and Nuclear Power" by David Ropeik discusses the role emotions have played in shaping public opinion in a (now-defunct, due to lack of signatures) effort to use California's initiative process to close down its two nuclear generating stations. Specifically, Ropeik brings into play some of the same "fear factors" which I discussed prior, including voluntariness - which is why, he points out, the public accepts radiation from medical sources with little complaint while the same cannot be said for nuclear power. Much of his essay delves into the same issues of how cultural and emotional factors influence and amplify public perception of risks, based risk characteristics (i.e., the factors like unfamiliarity, invisibility, "dread" factors like cancer, trust in institutions, etc.).

The second, "Fear of Nuclear Power out of proportion to actual risks" by Dr. Melanie Windridge serves as a useful companion piece, namely by framing the issue of the impact of public perception of risk - namely, in that how the public reacts to the health risks associated with nuclear is entirely out of proportion with other health risks, including both those from natural and medical uses of radiation as well as health risks associated with other energy sources like coal.

Unfortunately, I think Dr. Windridge's piece, while well-written, also serves as an example of how typically the conversation moves to individuals talking past one another. The aim of her article is to demonstrate how, even in the case of a serious accident like Fukushima, perceived risks tend to be held out of proportion with actual, everyday risks we blithely accept without protest. In this regard, she does quite well; and indeed, it is a refreshing reminder for those oriented in a more "technical" understanding of risk.

As I read it again however, and especially as I read the reader comments (again, perhaps one of the most discouraging things one can do), it becomes more and more clear to me that this piece represents the same mistake being made over and over again in nuclear communication - we're convincing those already predisposed to our position. To wit: those predisposed to hear the message that the public perceives nuclear risks out of proportion to other risks are likely those already predisposed to favor nuclear energy. The people who perceive these risks in disproportionate fashion are not going to be convinced by this alone. (Again, have a look at the reader comments and see if you don't agree. You may however wish to pour yourself a stiff drink first...) To emphasize, Dr. Windridge's piece is extremely clear and well-written but at the same time sails right past half the audience (those predisposed to oppose nuclear), who immediately dismiss anything she has to say.

Slogging through reader comments like these, it becomes again evident in the extreme that there are two completely divergent narratives going on here, with their own respective experts and "facts." (It goes nearly without saying that the divide could not be more stark - on one side one are trained nuclear professionals and experts in their field, the other populated by hucksters and cranks. On a personal note, it sometimes drives me positively insane in the regard that in the realm of climate science, there is a loud and well-publicized push-back against "bad faith science" but many of these same individuals remain silent when it comes to attacks on science by anti-nuclear activists.) That being said, none of this matters until the communicator can establish the one thing that matters most with their audience: credibility.

In this regard, despite the valiant efforts of numerous pro-nuclear communicators, we seem to be failing - badly. This is not to say that the efforts have been for nothing - certainly, pro-nuclear communicators have helped to profoundly shape and influence debate, pushing back against a narrative dominated by snake-oil salesmen bent upon selling cockamamie theories of radiation health effects with zero basis in sound science. And indeed, this has tremendous importance in capturing the otherwise "uncommitted" - those whose opinions on nuclear energy tends to be weak in support or opposition.

"Technically correct... the best kind of correct."

But part of the problem - at least as I see it - is that we are failing to directly engage our opponents themselves. In fact, too often am I realizing that nuclear risk is communicated with a tin ear to public perceptions - a fantastic example of this is Andrea Jennetta's recent (and somewhat amusing) rant in the Richmond Times-Dispatch to this regard, castigating nuclear professionals who, channeling the spirit of the bureaucrat - gave answers that were technically correct but contextually useless.

In this case, it concerned a debate over lifting the moratorium over uranium mining in southern Virginia - which to anyone familiar with the region, would be a much-needed economist boon to the region. What resulted instead was an unedifying spectacle involving quasi-religious questions and comments from anti-nuclear activists and tin-eared, highly abstract responses from the nuclear professionals tasked at handling questions from the public.

It reminds me of an old joke about engineers:

A man is flying in a hot air balloon and realizes he is lost. He reduces height and spots a man down below. He lowers the balloon further and shouts: "Excuse me, can you tell me where I am?" The man below says: "Yes, you're in a hot air balloon, hovering 30 feet above this field." "You must be an engineer" says the balloonist. "I am" replies the man. "How did you know?" "Well," says the balloonist, "everything you've told me is technically correct but useless to anyone."

 Of course, then there's the real punchline:

The man below says "you must be in management." "I am" replies the balloonist, "but how did you know?" "Well," says the man, "you don't know where you are, or where you're going, but you expect me to be able to help. You're in the same position you were before we met, but now it's my fault."

It again reinforces a point which I made previously which I am coming to realize the importance of - technically correct simply isn't enough - we, as nuclear communicators, must speak to values. One of the greatest scandals in nuclear communication has been in allowing the anti-nuclear opposition to take the field entirely unopposed in dressing their arguments in the ethics of care and concern - namely by painting both nuclear operators, and by association, nuclear advocates - as cogs in a rapacious, uncaring capitalist enterprise. (Not that there's anything wrong with capitalism...)

[Aside: I recently spent the evening with some very good friends of mine, one of whom works closely with the medical profession. She pointed out to me how much some of these same issues of risk communication overlap in the issues of public acceptance of vaccines - or rather, overcoming a small but dogged vaccine refusal movement. Fundamentally, many of the same issues are at play here - a series of parallel "experts" and a contingent doggedly set against the mainstream scientific establishment. What is at stake here is perhaps yet more important than the challenges faced by nuclear energy, given the dynamics at play with phenomena like herd immunity. But fundamentally the same issue is at play, that being the need to engage with individuals, particularly by addressing values as a means of understanding how to reach these individuals in order to accurately convey relative risk. End aside.]

A great number of nuclear professionals are in this line of work precisely because they care about creating a better world for their families and children (myself included). However, one likely reason nuclear professionals have ceded the issue of personal concern to the anti-nuclear activists has likely been a victim of technical culture - technical arguments are won and lost not over demonstrated concern or espoused values but upon facts alone. Engaging with the public thus almost requires a deprogramming for some - allowing technical experts to express their humanity and concern alongside their sound technical arguments.

No doubt, some resistance comes from the perception of falling into the same trap as the anti-nuclear movement - preying upon appeals to emotion rather than logic and couching arguments in terms of clever sound bites rather than in actual, robust appeals to science. Yet it doesn't need to come to this (and indeed, over the long run I believe strategies which focus upon this are doomed to failure as they serve to further undermine trust by coming across blatantly manipulative.) But falling down on the other extreme - communicating with a complete tin ear with regards to the audience - is clearly doing the nuclear movement no favors, either.

What it again fundamentally comes down to understanding the values of the audience. It means understanding why certain experts and arguments seem to hold sway (rather than simply dismissing these folks as cranks - again, something very hard not to do sometimes). Ultimately, it involves a great deal of listening - something which is not that easy, given the nature (and yes, ridiculousness) of some of the arguments put out there. But if nuclear advocates expect to sway those not already favorably predisposed toward nuclear energy, this is what it's going to take.

Cultural cognition of risk and perceived risks of nuclear

In a bit of a departure from the typical discussion, I wanted to delve deeper into a topic of some personal interest to me and of particular relevance to nuclear communication - that of risk perception by the public. As a scientist, people like me are trained to view risk in objective, impersonal terms - i.e., evaluating risk in strictly scientific, quantitative terms. One of the unending sources of frustration for the technical community is in the fact that this is not how the general public perceives risk - in fact, quite the opposite. Many times, people will blithely accept particular risks - driving, air travel, smoking, certain recreational activities - and yet recoil in horror at the unarguably lower risks presented by technologies such as nuclear energy (especially in comparison to energy alternatives such as coal and even natural gas).

Often, it's the first inclination of technically-minded folks to simply dismiss these people as irrational, even stupid. And yes, this is certainly easy - even satisfying (particularly on days when I'm feeling especially curmudgeonly...). It's also terribly unproductive. In light of this, I wanted to dig deeper into the idea of how public perceives risk, drawing on an established body of literature (again, perhaps most famously through projects like the Yale Law School's Cultural Cognition Project).

Understanding "perceived risk"

A particular school of thought in the social science of risk perception, known as the Cultural Theory of Risk, purports that the relative perception of risk - and ultimately, the determination of "acceptable" risk, is governed by cultural factors exogenous to strictly technical evaluations of risk alone. In other words, despite the fact that flying is safer than driving, people perceive the latter to be less safe due to other, outside factors. Thus a key element in understanding how risk is perceived by members of the public (i.e., the "non-technical" community) requires understanding the factors which tend to weigh upon evaluations of risk - in other words, factors which promote perceived risk. These include:

• Involuntary exposure
• Lack of personal control
• High/catastrophic consequences 
• Inequitable distribution of risk
• Lack of familiarity
• Lack of perceived benefit
• "Dread" factors (e.g., cancer)
• Irreversible consequences

In this way, risks of higher probability but more moderate consequences (e.g., natural gas explosions, coal waste accidents, etc.) are viewed as more "acceptable" despite much lower probabilities of harm from sources such as nuclear accidents. By the same token, risks which are mundane and taken up voluntarily - think smoking, etc. - are viewed as acceptable despite well-known and demonstrably higher probabilities of harm. 

Values and risk perception

An outgrowth of the Cultural Theory of Risk (or perhaps simply an alternative model altogether, although arguably not entirely incompatible) is the theory known as Cultural Cognition of Risk, which posits that deeply-held values influence how risks are perceived and processed by members of the public - and thus, which risks are seen as more prominent. Cultural Cognition (and the Cultural Cognition Project) seek to explain gaps in public perception of risk by looking at the correlations of risk perception to values - in other words, looking at why different political and cultural groups show wide disparities in perceived risks of large social issues, such as global climate change and other divisive issues.

Cultural Cognition divides value systems into two main axes. Roughly speaking, the vertical axis corresponds to values about how social goods (wealth, power, duties, and entitlements) are distributed, with "hierarchical" orientations favoring their distribution according to relatively "fixed" social markers - age, sex, race, etc. - and thus seeking to maintain these orderings. Conversely, egalitarian values tend to reject the idea of ranked hierarchies in the distribution of social goods. Along the horizontal axis is the relationship of the individual to society - leftward emphasizing a higher emphasis upon individuals and competitiveness, rightward emphasizing group solidarity over the individual. (An example of this can easily be observed in Eastern versus Western cultures, and in particular the expectations of individuals with respect to their societies.)

For those familiar with the Nolan Chart, or its variant, the Political Compass, there is a relatively intuitive mapping between the values proposed by Cultural Congition and the Personal/Economic liberty axes in each one (i.e., at the top left would be considered "conservatives," bottom right "liberals", bottom left "libertarians," and top right "populists"). Thus, the familiar partisan splits in nuclear energy support begin to grow more clear as one draws associations between the commonly held values of self-identified liberals, conservatives (and of course, libertarians!).

The central thesis of Cultural Cognition is that risk perception tends to be oriented along lines that remain harmonious with one's social values - risks which appear to challenge one's social values are minimized, which risks which speak to concerns of social values are heightened. Many of the topics studied under these lines of thought tend to include divisive social issues such as the role of gun ownership, abortion, nanotechnology, and indeed, nuclear power (in particular, nuclear waste management). Thus Cultural Cognition theory posits that differences in perceived risk due to major social issues comes from a reconciliation of information about risk with deeply-held personal values, thus explaining the gap in risk perception between different groups.

Education alone is not enough

Bringing this back to the subject of nuclear, it seems like once we understand what drives perception of risk, this should be enough to influence such perceptions more in line with actual facts. Yet one of the most discouraging findings in the literature on cultural cognition of risk is in that simply educating people is insufficient on its own, despite the naive assumption that such efforts bring about familiarity, thus diminishing outsized perceptions of risk. Why is this? Cognitive dissonance. For individuals already negatively predisposed toward a subject (i.e., nuclear energy), the presentation of new information produces an uncomfortable state of dissonance, which the natural mental reaction is to resolve. Typically this is done by dismissing the conflicting information and seeking reinforcing information from "trusted" sources, thus perhaps illustrating why, in spite of repeated debunking, some myths just won't die. And indeed, this is something we've seen before - again and again.

Going yet further, proponents of the Cultural Cognition hypothesis posit that educating participants on topics to which they were begin previously uninformed can actually produce a polarizing effect in attitudes. An example of this is a study in participant attitudes in nanotechnology, where most individuals have little starting information. The presentation of educational materials on the risks and benefits of nanotechnology actually had the effect of polarizing these individuals, despite the same information being presented - again implying that education on its own does not necessarily lead to broad accord.

Does this mean education is hopeless? Not at all - but what it does mean is that education must be carried out in a way which minimizes cognitive dissonance, namely by engaging with the value system of the listener.  That is, in presenting information in such a way which affirms rather than challenges the deeply-held values of the audience, said persons are more likely to be open to processing this new information and challenging previously-held beliefs.

In my last post, I alluded to the fact that individuals holding an "individualist" value persuasion were more likely to be open to evaluating risks of global climate change if nuclear power is presented in this context as the solution to climate change, rather than regulation. (Joe Romm, are you listening?) In this case, it is a matter of a message speaking to the values of the listener - individualists tend to be more prone to considering technological solutions to social problems and disinclined to solutions which encroach upon private, market-oriented mechanisms to social ordering. 

As a personal aside, I will say as someone with a similar worldview, the connection between nuclear energy and climate change made a similar impression upon myself - that is, in evaluating climate change as a problem to be solved through human ingenuity rather than imposed impoverishment, a discordance is removed - it is possible to reconcile a concern for climate change with previously-held values.

Obviously, this works with different value orientations as well - those with egalitarian value systems can arguably be brought around to support nuclear energy if it is seen as affirming egalitarian social values - two examples which come to mind are those of energy poverty and the inherently unequal outcomes of climate change, which would disproportionately impact the world's poorest nations (i.e., those incapable of adapting to climate change through economic and technical means).

Summing it up

To summarize - providing education and facts are good, useful even - but on their own insufficient without presenting those facts in a context which engages with the deeply-held values of the audience. To produce actual engagement - and even inducement to support - requires a producing a context of facts compatible with the values of those one is trying to reach. In other words, for the case of nuclear, it means going beyond education and comparative evaluation of risk (again, to emphasize, both of which are valid in and of themselves) and placing these within the framework of how this speaks to the values of the audience.

For individualists (who the research shows already tend to have a lower perceived risk attached to nuclear energy), this might mean presenting nuclear energy as a practical solution to climate change - something which has the spillover benefit of bringing about thoughtful consideration of the issues of climate change itself. For communitarians and egalitarians, this might mean both engaging in a demonstration of how nuclear energy can serve to mitigate much larger, more inequitable risks while meanwhile also honestly engaging concerns over safety and inter-generational equity issues like waste management. In other words, validating these concerns while demonstrating that these are issues which we take seriously and continue to devote considerable attention to.

None of this is a silver-bullet solution for engaging with the public, but it provides an illuminating context for which to facilitate a more productive discussion over energy.

A passage which struck me while I was researching this topic was when one proponent of cultural rationality (i.e., arguing that emotional reactions to risk have validity as moral, "normative" evaluations, alongside strictly technical, "positive" evaluations of risk) argued that members of the technological community do not have a privileged view of the normative factors associated with risk, particularly with respect to nuclear (the paper was on perceptions of nuclear risk in light of Fukushima) - that is, while members of the technical community have a privileged view of technical facts, they do not have a privileged view of overall assessments of what constitutes acceptability in risk - a normative judgement.

All of this of course is true. In as much, in my mind it is the job of the nuclear professionals (as members of the "technical community") to do our best to provide an accurate technical framework for these evaluations of risk by the public, such that they can make the most sound decisions on risk. Meanwhile it is the job of nuclear communicators and advocates to speak to values, as to produce more fair evaluations of both the benefits and risks of nuclear, particularly in the context of available energy choices.

Minding the (partisan) gap: partisan divisions in support for nuclear

Via NEI's twitter feed comes this story of a new Gallup poll on energy and environmental issues similar to that released by Pew which I dissected a few weeks ago.

Image via Gallup

For the most part, the trends are indeed quite similar - especially in the respect that public opinion on the issue of nuclear energy appears to be quite "sticky," consistently polling at a slight majority of Americans favoring its continued use (and even expansion). Unsurprisingly, support for the expanded use of nuclear energy is riven by partisan divides, with much broader numbers of Republicans favoring its expansion over Democrats.

Indeed, this partisan fissure is consistent with Pew's prior polling, with Democrats and Democratic-leaning voters strongly favoring measures including more stringent environmental regulations and more funding for alternative sources such as wind and solar, with much weaker support for the development of new nuclear or fossil fuel exploration. (Interestingly, support for new nuclear among Democrats is weaker than that of opening up federal lands for oil exploration.)

The Republican side naturally shows the inverse, with Republicans generally favoring policies to expand energy supplies (with the relative strength of support for opening up additional land for oil exploration as Democrats show for conservation and regulatory measures). A notable difference in this poll is much stronger support among Republicans for expanding nuclear energy, being the second-favorite choice among Republicans and Republican-leaners at 64% of respondents favoring, compared to 54% in the similar Pew poll.

	% in favor
	National Adults	Republicans	Democrats
Setting higher emissions and pollution standards for business and industry	70	54	85
Spending more government money on developing solar and wind power	69	51	84
Spending government money to develop alternate sources of fuel for automobiles	66	51	81
Imposing mandatory controls on carbon dioxide emissions/other greenhouse gases	65	50	82
Opening up land owned by the federal government for oil exploration	65	84	49
More strongly enforcing federal environmental regulations	64	47	80
Setting higher auto emissions standards for automobiles	62	49	76
Expanding the use of nuclear energy	52	64	41

Getting back to the issue of "stickiness" in public opinion, while support for expanding nuclear has been steadily growing among Republicans since the early 2000s, among Democrats support appears to be stuck around 40%, after briefly spiking around 2006 (incidentally, around the time of Al Gore's most famous work, An Inconvenient Truth was released).

Given the need to develop new domestic sources of energy and the general drive to phase out dirtier sources like coal, it provokes a nagging question - why such a stark partisan divide over one of the largest clean energy sources in the U.S. by share of electricity (around 20%)? Indeed, it's one thing to expect broad divisions overall (given the relative weight individuals assign to factors such as economics, waste management, safety, and so forth). And indeed, some of the split will be driven by familiarity with energy sources overall (i.e., the feasibility, not to mention practicality of providing electricity from intermittent sources at the caprice of nature). An of course, splits along other lines are perhaps more obvious manifestations of priorities - take the split over fossil exploration. But what explains nuclear?

One explanation (which I will cover in a follow-on post) is the influence of cultural factors - specifically, cultural factors which influence risk perception. There is an entire field of study devoted to this, such as the Cultural Cognition Project at the Yale Law School. Ultimately what it boils down to is that how individuals perceive risk and respond to new information is dramatically influenced by their value systems. And, perhaps unsurprisingly, the same patterns of values which tend to divide liberals and conservatives also tend to divide across issues such as the perceived risk of nuclear energy production (along with related issues, such as nuclear waste management).

However, this can cut both ways as well, a matter which should be of key interest to those committed to action on global climate change. A teaser for next time - one particularly interesting finding is those of value persuasions typically found in conservatives that if expanded use of nuclear energy is presented as a necessary solution to global climate change, these individuals become more open to evidence of the risks of climate change, as compared to greater regulatory control over industrial activity - precisely due to the issues of concordance of values. Food for thought.