What is most important to outreach? Just showing up.

In my prior wrap-up over the Chattanooga MOX hearing, one of the key takeaway lessons for nuclear outreach I found while helping to organize students attending the NNSA hearing on surplus weapons-grade plutonium disposition in MOX fuel is this: Showing up matters.

In fact, there's an old Woody Allen quote circulating around which summarizes this best:

80% of success is just showing up.

In a later interview, Allen would extend upon his prior quip:

I made the statement years ago which is often quoted that 80 percent of life is showing up. People used to always say to me that they wanted to write a play, they wanted to write a movie, they wanted to write a novel, and the couple of people that did it were 80 percent of the way to having something happen. All the other people struck out without ever getting that pack. They couldn’t do it, that’s why they don’t accomplish a thing, they don’t do the thing, so once you do it, if you actually write your film script, or write your novel, you are more than half way towards something good happening. So that I was say my biggest life lesson that has worked. All others have failed me.

Why bring all of this up again? Namely because I think a recent outreach case organized by Meredith Angwin (of Yes Vermont Yankee) and Howard Shaffer at a recent public hearing in support of the Vermont Yankee reactor so perfectly reinforces this point. Angwin and Shaffer managed to organize a crowd of supporters of the plant for a public hearing on its renewal for a Certificate of Public Good (required for the plant to continue to do business in the state - this in spite of the fact that the actual safety license to operate is controlled exclusively by the NRC). In fact, they managed to do this and then some, with supporters outnumbering opponents three-to-one.

The result? News coverage of the event represents their side and their message in addition to the opponents. They (VY supporters) controlled the tone of the meeting, keeping it civil and respectful. (This is in marked contrast to some meetings where Angwin reports being hopelessly outnumbered - and thus where the tone is decidedly different).

The exact same thing was seen when one contrasts the meeting coverage of NNSA hearings in Chattanooga versus meetings later that week in Decatur, AL (closer to the Brown's Ferry reactor, a TVA candidate site for MOX). With nuclear supporters absent, the "public" consisted of professional anti-nuclear activists going from meeting to meeting repeating the same (debunked) arguments. (Notice that certain individuals, like Tom Clements of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, show up multiple times). The tone of the stories reflects the absence of supporters - as a result, opponents have the narrative to themselves - they are the public. When supporters were present (as in Chattanooga), it is reported as "spirited debate" - the existence of a pro-nuclear side is acknowledged.

In other words, the media won't come find you if you're not there. What makes up much of reporting, particularly at the local level like this, is storytelling. When one side is absent, their story doesn't get told. Reporters aren't going to seek it out - in fact, they're unlikely to even acknowledge its existence. This is why showing up matters so much. Ultimately, the way most of the public will learn about issues like MOX (or Vermont Yankee, etc.) will not be through direct contact with opponents or supporters, but rather through reported accounts in the media - which means if one side doesn't show up, the public simply will not know about it. It's simply not part of the narrative.

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As an aside, I am currently at the ANS Winter Meeting in San Diego, CA - do say hello if you catch me sometime while I'm there. (I already had the pleasure of meeting Will Davis of Atomic Power Review for the first time last night, and I'm hoping to run into more folks from the online community). This probably explains my itching to emphasize the importance of outreach so much, of course - namely because I'm also going to be talking about some of these same important lessons with other nuclear professionals while I'm here.

Civilian nuclear energy programs as a "fig leaf" for proliferation: Does it matter?

The Washington Post today featured an interesting article detailing many of the difficulties and setbacks encountered by Iran's enrichment program, post-Stuxnet. In part what it illustrates is the technical difficulty of actually attempting to engineer a proliferation attempt, even given access to facilities and technical know-how.

Iran has been plagued by problems, owing chiefly due to the fact that separating isotopes which vary only slightly in atomic weight (U-235 versus U-238) is an extremely challenging process from a technical perspective. Centrifuges accomplish this task by spinning tubes of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), a green gel which becomes an extremely corrosive gas when heated; the heavier U-238 is pushed further outward down the tube, allowing for the lighter U-235 to be "skimmed" off. This process must be repeated hundreds of times (i.e., through "cascades" of connected centrifuges) in order to separate out useful quantities of U-235. Centrifuges must be precision-engineered and capable of spinning at incredible speeds - hundreds of meters per second, and capable of tolerating extreme mechanical stress. As the above article points out, this is not an easy task, especially with aging equipment and sub-standard materials.

A key take-away lesson here should be that even with the backing of a sovereign state and scientists with the technical know-how, proliferation is not easy. (Given enough time and resources, it is clearly not impossible - but both of these factors tend to be the chief constraints of any proliferation attempt.)

One issue in the reporter's choice of language jumps out, however:

Although Iran continues to stockpile enriched uranium in defiance of U.N. resolutions, two new reports portray the country’s nuclear program as riddled with problems as scientists struggle to keep older equipment working.

Here's the thing - the problem is not Iran enriching uranium per se. So-called "enriched" uranium can be anywhere from 1-99% U-235, the "fissile" species of uranium which exists in only trace quantities (less than a percent) in nature. Yet only uranium which has been enriched to high levels of U-235 - at least 20% (classified as "highly enriched uranium" or HEU), and generally for weapons on the order of 90% - is considered actually suitable for a weapon. Most civilian reactors use uranium enriched between 2-6% ("low enriched uranium" - LEU) - itself useless for a uranium-based explosive device.


Nowhere in the article is it stated whether Iran has actually produced HEU; to date, no evidence has been presented that they in fact have gone up to this level. Does this mean that I am naive enough to believe Iran has only benevolent intentions with their program? Of course not. But it's also incredibly sloppy journalism to imply that uranium enrichment on its own is a nefarious project; enrichment to low levels is a mundane part of the civilian fuel cycle. Much like any technology, enrichment can be used for good or evil; but the simple act of uranium enrichment on its own does not itself constitute a grave situation. Incidentally, a similar form of collective panic takes hold with particular concern trolls (who shall remain nameless) any time a new enrichment technology - such as laser-based enrichment (e.g., SILEX) is introduced. 

This leads into the broader question which is often posed as a challenge to nuclear energy: are civilian programs used as a cover for weapons applications? Fundamentally, a point my colleague Alan raised which remains true is that weapons are a consequence of a regime that decides to pursue weapons. There are numerous historical examples of regimes which have either developed only an anemic civilian nuclear power capacity and weapons (e.g., Pakistan, Israel) or none at all (North Korea). In other words, the decision to proliferate does not seem to historically spring from the development of a civilian fuel cycle - in fact, research by my former adviser Dr. Man-Sung Yim shows that increasing development of total civilian nuclear power capacity has a negative correlation with historical decisions to proliferate. There are several possible explanations for such a phenomenon, but chief among them may be the fact that countries which begin to enjoy the benefits of civilian power programs do not wish to see these economic benefits jeopardized by proliferation decisions.


To emphasize: none of this implies that we should not have reasonable safeguards against proliferation, such as measures the IAEA undertakes with host states and operators, such as inventory tracking and regular inspections of facilities. But it does call into question the larger logic of non-proliferation as objection to nuclear energy systems at large. Assuming that civilian programs are used as a cover for military applications - as is suspected in the case of Iran, for example - what exactly should this imply? One must ask - do opponents of nuclear energy demand that countries who have shown neither the propensity nor desire to proliferate also forfeit their ambitions for nuclear energy programs as a token symbolic gesture?

As history has shown, even assuming such programs are used as a "fig leaf" for proliferation activities, civilian programs are neither necessary to proliferation nor are they even necessarily promoters of such (in fact, the opposite claim can be supported). Can civilian fuel cycles be co-opted for military use? Yes, of course - the same enrichment facility used to produce LEU for fuel can easily be repurposed to produce HEU for weapons. Yet in this sense, civilian nuclear energy systems are no more a "promoter" of proliferation any more than automobile manufacturers are a "promoter" of vehicular homocide. The argument simply doesn't hold up.

Upcoming Films about Nuclear Power

This is a special post to cover all of the ongoing film projects about nuclear power that I'm aware of. Some of the developments that have motivated these labors of love (making an independent film) include the recent revival in interest in nuclear power plants and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. While I would love to write about all of the documentaries about nuclear power in the last decade (and maybe I will in another post), there are so many that I'm limiting this to works currently in development. My hope is that they will all be available for 2012 showings.

We have previously written about information sessions held to answer public questions about the Fukushima Daiichi impacts. This is the defining nuclear disaster for the current young generation in nuclear, and I believe that films are an excellent way of reaching a broader audience in the community. Indeed, most universities and communities will have some theaters interested in independent film fests and regular educational documentary showings. The films here are likely to be a great win-win for local nuclear power advocacy groups as well as small theaters. NC State has a vibrant campus cinema with significant involvement from the sustainability office.

Pandora's Promise

This film aims to address the changing dynamic of nuclear power and the environmental movement, the impact of Fukushima, and the big questions around nuclear power and society. It boasts original filming around the globe, has an impressive cast, and an experienced director. The vision seems grand and I am personally very curious as to how the director, Robert Stone, will put this all together. It appears that the funding level is in the several $100,000 range, which is probably a lot more than the rest of the films in this post.

• Focus: Anti-nuclear orthodoxy being challenged
• Release: Planned Early 2012
• Length: Feature Length
• Trailer: none that I'm aware of
• Poster: none that I'm aware of
• Donations: Currently accepting donations

Uncanny Terrain

Two Chicago-based filmmakers are following the events around organic farmers in the Tohoku region. Some of their youtube uploads include farmers who were outright displaced by the evacuation order, as well as those facing conflicts due to concerns about levels of radioactivity and selling their product. The plot follows specifically the Color of the Four Seasons Farm (unofficial translation) which is 45 miles away from the disaster. It starts from the spring planting season, and I imagine that the ending is as-of-yet unwritten even in real life. They are also collaborating with RDTN.org and safecast, which are groups trying to croudsource radiation mapping efforts (that I've mentioned on this blog before).

• Focus: Fukushima Farmer's Plight
• Release: Shooting through at least 2012 spring, updates are on the blog and Facebook
• Length: Feature Length
• Trailer: Here is a sample update (youtube)
• Poster: none that I'm aware of
• Donations: Currently accepting donations

The Nuclear Option

The focus of this film is on the potential of nuclear to address our energy needs. It frames the debate in a very beautiful trailer seems to present nuclear in the context of our overall energy choices like Pandora's Promise. I like this part of the director's statement, "It almost seems as if the future of sustainable energy, and our economy at large remains trapped within the nucleus of an atom". So there you go.

• Focus: Nuclear power's potential contribution
• Release: No officially announced date that I'm aware of
• Length: Unknown
• Trailer: A fantastic trailer is on vimeo
• Poster: Yes, available on its website
• Donations: See the get involved page

SHOREHAM

The Shoreham plant has a unique place in history, as it was fully completed but never produced electricity after commercial operation was canceled in an arrangement between the government and the utility. It attracted very strong opposition, and this film goes behind those lines, analyzing the arguments against the plants, what factors lead to the final outcome, and the broader discussion about nuclear power.

This film effort has been releasing bits and pieces of the work over the last few months, you can find the videos on youtube and several updates on the Atomic Insights Blog. No word yet on other formats it can be obtained in. You can start from Chapter 1 and click through the rest. Or you can start the autoplay list.

• Focus: The Shoreham plant story
• Release: Final chapters coming out around now, can watch online
• Length: 1 hr, 29 min + some
• Trailer: Watch the whole thing!
• Poster: Buy online (cafe press)
• Donations: Closed, had funding rounds on Indiegogo and Kickstarter

(Edit) The SHOREHAM film was not complete when I wrote this. They have since posted a Chapter 9. I don't know how many it will go to, but you can still use that playlist link to access them all.(End Edit)

If there is any information that you feel is missing or inaccurate, please leave a comment.

Why I'm not worrying about Fort Calhoun (and you shouldn't either)

Given the recent flooding along the Missouri River and my own personal connection to the area, I've been following the news regarding Fort Calhoun (or "Fort Kaboom" as it is sometimes pejoratively known) with a great deal of interest. (Likewise, I'm sure several readers of this blog from the area are doing the same.) And of course, given recent circumstances, some degree of misinformation is to be expected, particularly from those pushing an agenda.

In particular, there have been reports (of rather dubious origin) claiming that Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency (FAAE) is reporting that the International Atomic Energy Agency has provided them information on a supposed "information blackout" regarding conditions at the plant, including a "potential near meltdown condition." Never mind of course that the plant has been in a state of cold shutdown (i.e., no power being produced) for over a month (since April 9th), given that it was under a scheduled outage for refueling and maintenance when the flooding began. In other words, a "meltdown" in the sense of Three-Mile Island (or even Fukushima, in which the core was shut down immediately after the earthquake) is physically impossible.

Further, a brief review of the IAEA's website reveals no such alarming news. In addition, any large radiation releases from the plant would be immediately detected by any number of independent radiation monitors not under the control of the NRC, thus making any claim that the administration has somehow orchestrated a "media blackout" all the more laughable. (Not to mention the sheer implausibility of such a blackout, considering the government's inability to control other recent releases deemed sensitive.) More than a grain of salt would be warranted, here.

Other claims include that a brief control room fire has lead to a catastrophic loss of power to the pumps circulating cooling water to the spent fuel cooling pools, inviting the inevitable comparisons to Fukushima Daaichi Unit 4 (e.g., where water levels became a concern after several days following the earthquake). However, the NRC has reported that the fire was quickly contained and that power was restored. Further, unlike Fukushima, while the flooding is most serious, operators are not facing the crisis situation at Fukushima, which involved a total station blackout and a struggle to cool three recently shutdown reactors, all while dealing with the natural devastation from a record earthquake and tsunami. In other words, the situations don't even remotely compare.

The NRC's blog recently deflated several ongoing myths regarding Ft. Calhoun, including the following:

• The FAA has not "closed" the airspace over Ft. Calhoun*. The airspace above domestic nuclear plants has been restricted as of September 11, 2001 for security reasons. Given the attention on Ft. Calhoun, OPPD requested that the FAA issue a "gentle reminder" to pilots regarding this fact.
• The brief control room fire did briefly interrupt power to the spent fuel cooling pumps, but these pumps are not currently offline, nor is there currently a danger of the spent fuel pools boiling over and exposing the fuel rods.

Other rumors include the idea that somehow Ft. Calhoun will be overrun by the rising flood waters, thereby washing away the backup diesel generators and producing a similar station blackout condition as experienced by Fukushima. However, several notable differences exist. First, a flood is a far slower, far more predictable process than a tsunami; as a result, operators have had more than adequate time to prepare earth berm flood defenses at the plant. These defenses were erected per federal guidelines well before the flooding began. Second, the backup power generators at Fort Calhoun are in hardened structures (again, unlike Fukushima), minimizing the overall risk of a total "station blackout" condition.

Fort Calhoun Nuclear Generating Station (Image credit: AP)

In addition, Dan Yurman at Idaho Samizdat has also been busy spiking the rumors regarding Fort Calhoun. Among other things, he reports that the earth flood walls provide protection for another 5-foot rise in floodwaters (currently at 1005 feet); the diesel generators have an additional foot of protection from flooding. 

One of the chief things to keep in mind in all of this is that natural disasters aren't something which is simply neglected by nuclear plant operators; in fact, quite the opposite. Given the Missouri river's history, contingency plans against cases such as this are part of the standard operating protocol for any plant like Ft. Calhoun. Given that, my own personal concern is far more focused upon the fact that the reported flooding could last for through August, drastically impacting eastern Nebraska and western Iowa.

*Update: As one reader points out, OPPD has requested additional temporary airspace restrictions over Ft. Calhoun, banning all aircraft in a radius of two nautical miles (about 2.3 miles or 3.7 km) under a flight altitude of 3500 feet. (In other words, low-flying aircraft.)

Events This Week in Raleigh NC about Fukushima Daiichi Impacts

Here are some more things going on around the NC State campus on the nuclear events in Japan. Both of them do note that visitors/guests are welcome, so feel free to share with anyone interested. Nuclear Engineering departments all over the nation have already put on a large number of events, but it continues to be a hot topic as we now transition into the real discussion about national and worldwide impacts of the event.

There is an event on NC State Centennial campus Tuesday (the 26th), discussion at 6pm, talk at 6:30pm, hosted by the IEEE Eastern North Carolina Section. (online RSVP form)

Japan Nuclear Incident - A Perspective
J Michael Doster, PhD
Professor, Department of Nuclear Engineering

The Japanese earthquake and subsequent tragic nuclear disaster came as a shock to us all. J Michael Doster PhD, Professor of Nuclear Engineering at NCSU, will offer a perspective on the Japanese Nuclear Incident and the societal impact of such events.

The NC State Nuclear Engineering department seminar is on Thursday (the 28th) in Room 1202 Burlington Engineering Labs, discussion at 3:45 and talk at 4pm and addresses what appears to be a wide range of issues.

What will be the Legacy of Fukushima? Implications for Nuclear Energy in Japan, the US, and Globally
William Kinsella, PhD
Associate Professor, Department of Communication

Seven weeks after an earthquake and tsunami triggered a nuclear crisis in Japan, the long-term implications for global nuclear energy programs remain unclear. With a 90-day safety review underway, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is continuing its approval processes for new reactor licenses and license extensions. Germany has returned to the nuclear phase-out plan it had recently moved away from. Emerging nuclear nations such as China and India maintain ambitious visions for expanding their reactor fleets, but face a range of uncertainties. Meanwhile, global and national concerns regarding energy costs and energy security continue to grow. This presentation addresses questions of nuclear safety, regulation, cost, financing, insurance, public opinion, national policy, and global interconnectedness in this turbulent context.

Of course, these are not the only local people active related to the events in Japan. I was surprised to find that a photographer from the local newspaper, the News and Observer, had traveled to Japan after the earthquake and is having a showing this weekend.

Recent presentations on the events at Fukushima

• Professors from NC State's Department of Nuclear Engineering gave a symposium yesterday on the events at Fukushima, including an analysis of what happened and potential health consequences, as well as a Q&A from the audience. The entire symposium is now available for public viewing (no login required).
• The University of Wisconsin-Madison gave a similar forum, which is also available online.
• MIT's Department of Nuclear Engineering also gave a forum available on the web, although this was earlier in the timeline (and thus the information is likely less up-to-date).

Each of these presentations was designed to engage and inform the general public about the events which have occurred at Fukushima, including a specific explanation of what we understand to have happened so far from the perspective of experts and ultimately what is being done now to bring the situation under control. The advantage of these types of seminars is that the offer the ability to convey more detailed explanations of the specific sequences of events that lead to the current situation which are typically not available in traditional media accounts.

When the media gets it right (and wrong)

First, let's talk about some cases where they get it right.

William Saletan at Slate: Nuclear Overreactors. Saletan in a very welcome fashion throws a bit of cold water on the current hyperbole about the Japanese nuclear situation, especially given the current risks we tolerate from other sources of energy (particularly oil, although the same could be said for natural gas extraction as well).

The New York Times has an excellent interactive feature explaining the mechanics involved with the Fukushima reactors in basic terms - it does a very nice job visualizing what's going on here.

WNYC, a New York City NPR affiliate, had an interview with former GE VP for Engineering Quality at GE Nuclear Margaret Harding.

And of course, here's NC State's own Professor Paul Turinsky (who is also on my dissertation committee!) explaining the basics of nuclear reactors on the local news:




Also (perhaps shockingly enough), here's Glenn Beck actually doing a passable job at explaining the issue of defense in depth at reactors like Fukushima with the help of his infamous chalkboard and some M&M's. (He doesn't get quite everything right, but he does do an admirable job compared to many.)

Then, of course, there's the predictable reactions by those who don't really know much about what they're talking about.

First, there's syndicated columnist Anne Applebaum, someone not normally given to fits of hyperbole, with this: If the Japanese can’t build a safe reactor, who can?

Where exactly does one begin with this premise? That somehow, the fact that there is a problem given the fact that these reactors withstood an earthquake well beyond the design basis - one of the largest earthquakes in recorded history - along with a massive tsunami, somehow "demonstrates" that nuclear energy is categorically "unsafe?" (Again, let's see the natural gas facility that can stand up to a similar beating without bursting into flames.)

As they say in the infomercials however, "but wait, there's more!":

Increasingly, nuclear power is also promoted because it safe. Which it is — except, of course, when it is not. Chances of a major disaster are tiny, one in a hundred million. But in the event of a statistically improbable major disaster, the damage could include, say, the destruction of a city or the poisoning of a country. The cost of such a potential catastrophe is partly reflected in the price of plant construction, and it partly explains the cost overruns in Finland: Nobody can risk the tiniest flaw in the concrete or the most minimal reduction in the quality of the steel. 

But as we are about to learn in Japan, the true costs of nuclear power are never reflected even in the very high price of plant construction. Inevitably, the enormous costs of nuclear waste disposal fall to taxpayers, not the nuclear industry. The costs of cleanup, even in the wake of a relatively small accident, are eventually borne by government, too. Health-care costs will also be paid by society at large, one way or another. If there is true nuclear catastrophe in Japan, the entire world will pay the price.

A few problems, here. First, "the destruction of a city or the poisoning of a country?" A reminder that bears repeating: not one single person was killed due to Three Mile Island. None. And so far, the only person killed as a direct result of Japan's reactor accident has been a crane operator - and this was due to the earthquake, not the reactor itself. And why is that? Because nuclear engineers take the job of safety very, very seriously. Reactors are designed with multiple barriers against radioactive release in order to prevent these very dire consequences Applebaum refers to. Every reactor in operation right now in the United States and Japan has multiple systems to prevent radioactive release, unlike the Chernobyl system which undoubtedly Ms. Applebaum refers to.

Furthermore, in the United States at least, the cost of waste disposal is not paid for by the government. Each utility pays a fee ($0.001 per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated) into a waste disposal fund, since the 1980s. This fund has accumulated over $30 billion - of which, only $10 billion has been spent on the (now-defunct) Yucca Mountain repository. One can argue that these costs are picked up by ratepayers, but certainly not taxpayers writ large.

And as for health care costs? Look at the numbers for premature deaths due to every other energy source, particularly for coal, oil, and others. (Even "green" energy sources have their own costs, from toxic waste generated to manufacture semiconductors for solar cells to the environmental impacts to construct and operate wind turbines). The basic story here is simple: there is no "free lunch," and there is certainly no "risk free" form of energy. The best we can do is to weigh the relative risks and benefits appropriately.

Of course, Applebaum's column looks positively benign compared to this piece by Patrick Doherty posted on CNN, originally titled "America needs a path to disaster-free energy." (CNN has since updated the title, although one can catch a hint of the original in the URL.)

Ugh. There's nothing wrong with different points of view, but there is something positively despicable about exploiting tragedy in order to push a particular agenda.