The inherent shallowness of "market-based" arguments against nuclear

In the middle of a lengthy takedown of Taxpayers for Common Sense's recent publicity stunt press release proclaiming their "Golden Fleece" award over the DOE's recent award of $452 million for NRC licensing assistance to B&W to construct a first-of-a-kind SMR at the Clinch River site, +Rod Adams brings up an extremely insightful point almost universally neglected in "market-based" critiques of described subsidies for nuclear energy. Specifically, Rod points out a perverse, unintended regulatory consequence brought on by anti-trust laws addressed by the Price-Anderson Act, which governs financial liability in the event of a nuclear accident. (The whole thing is of course well-worth reading.)

Rod points out:

The shared liability approach [inherent to Price-Anderson], if taken without permission, would violate the anti-trust laws that prevent competitors from cooperating. Price-Anderson’s system rewards the industry for sharing detailed technical information that would normally be carefully protected trade secrets. The nuclear industry’s habit of widely sharing important information and lessons learned from experience is one of the foundations on which its excellent safety record is built.

Image: NRC 

To those unfamiliar with how the Price-Anderson liability law works, the NRC has a helpful fact sheet which explains the basics. Contrary to common portrayal, Price-Anderson does not simply act as an "escape hatch" for financial liability for nuclear reactor operators. Each reactor operator is required to hold private insurance for $375 million per individual unit; after this limit is exceeded, a second tier of insurance from cross-pooling across each operating reactor kicks in - up to $11.6 billion. In other words, the liability structure of Price-Anderson explicitly makes it such that "an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere" - there is a shared financial liability across every operator.

The dispute arises of course as to what happens above the $11.975 billion liability threshold - yet this has never actually been tested. (In fact, after Three Mile Island, the worst nuclear accident in U.S. history, $175 million in funds came solely from the "first tier" - i.e., private insurance). Critics are of course free to make their case that the cap is too low - but it first involves an honest reckoning of what the actual liability structure actually is.

More important however, arguments like this tend to underscore a common problem with many of some of these so-called "market" critiques of nuclear energy - even cursory inspection tends to reveal how thin a paint job has been applied to what is primarily a vehicle for advancing a dogmatic anti-nuclear agenda. (I say this too as someone who is almost always first disposed toward market-based solutions.)

Such a harsh critique comes primarily from the shallowness of the arguments presented - which, like TCS's "Golden Fleece," focus primarily on the seen (i.e., the DOE's licensing assistance) and less so on the unseen (i.e., the flawed NRC licensing process which makes it incredibly difficult for new market entrants to feasibly seek design certification). In other words, the "market-based" aspect is simply invoked as a shallow pretext for one-sided arguments applied solely to nuclear energy, rather than across the entirety of the energy sector.

Thus why I highlight Rod's point: A fair free-market critique of the energy industry - nuclear included - would also look at the barriers erected by government regulation (which in turn are what spur the calls for so-called "subsidies" which free-market groups generally oppose). The perverse consequences of anti-trust regulation from information-sharing are an insightful example of this; likewise there is the issue of the regulatory standard for long-term disposal of nuclear waste. For example, a geologic repository for permanent disposal of nuclear waste is required to meet a standard of no more than 10 mrem/year exposure to the public over 10,000 years, followed by 100 mrem/year up to 1 million years. (How one evaluates these begins to leave the realm of engineering and move more into the realm of divination...) To give some perspective - this involves a protection standard equivalent to less than 5% of the average background dose one receives from natural sources over the initial post-closure period, and less than 30% in the million-year period. To put it in more familiar terms, this corresponds maximum exposure equivalent to 1 chest x-ray per year in the first 10,000 years, followed by half the dose from a head CT scan (and 1/10th the dose of a whole-body CT scan) over the next 990,000 years. (Discharges from nuclear plants are regulated still more strictly, at 0.3 mrem per year maximum - less than a standard dental x-ray.)

Ask yourself this - when is the last time you've heard of a coal or natural gas facility being required to sequester their toxic wastes from the public in near-perpetuity? (Likewise even with toxic heavy metal wastes incident to the production of solar panels). How many other facilities are required to pay hourly costs for regulators evaluating license applications (much less put in the encyclopedic licensing applications to begin with)?

The point here is not simply to complain or to justify any special treatment on the part of the nuclear industry - but it does provoke a question of why more so-called "market advocates" in energy only look at one side of the coin. A deeper (and more insightful) analysis would consider the inherent barriers erected as well - including the perverse consequences of features like anti-trust regulations and unequal applications of standards for risk exposure across different energy-producing industries - rather than  cherry-picking analysis we're typically treated to presently - thin gruel, indeed.

Scientagonism: The problem of antagonistic science communication

A recent column by Daniel Sarewitz in Nature on bridging the "partisan divide" with respect to public perception of science inspired some spirited debate over on my twitter feed yesterday. The short version goes something like this: scientists are often perceived as being in the thrall of Democrats, exposing the greater scientific enterprise to being undermined as simply another partisan front (or, alternatively factionalizing, wherein partisan camps each bring in their own "experts" an accuse the other side of "junk science). None of this is helped by scientists who go out of their way to bring on their antagonism - see, for example, the letter signed by 68 Nobel laureates endorsing President Obama over Mitt Romney in the last election (in which Sarewitz notes that of the 68, 43 have a record of public donations to candidates, and of these, only five have ever donated to Republican candidates, and none in the last election cycle). It goes without saying that, well-meaning as it may be, openly partisan activities like this aren't helping with the whole "not being perceived as a lockstep Democratic constituency" thing. (Note that I am explicitly not advocating mass abdication of scientists from the political discourse, which a genuinely terrible idea - but rather, a caution that lending one's scientific credibility to openly partisan ventures may not be in the best strategic interests of science...)

Sarewitz recommends bringing together scientists with less monolithic political views together to demonstrate overall scientific consensus on key issues such as global climate change and the like, along with ensuring greater ideological balance in high-profile scientific advisory panels. The overall of goal of such an enterprise would be in restoring a public perception of science as a bipartisan enterprise - and in particular, inoculating policies based on scientific recommendations as simply being based upon "partisan science" - or to use a favorite expression - bringing in the "dueling PhD's." Unfortunately, while Sarewitz correctly diagnoses the problem, his solution falls far short.

The deeper problem here antagonism - both perceived and real. Dan Kahan (of the Yale Cultural Cognition Project) has prolifically written about the issue of "Cultural Cognition" - in other words, how our individual values can (unconsciously) conspire to shape perceptions of risk to accommodate our pre-existing worldviews (something I've discussed prior in how this relates to public perception of risk and nuclear energy) - also known as motivated reasoning. In essence, the mind rebels against cognitive dissonance and will do what it takes to ensure such is resolved - namely by shaping our perceptions to confirm previously-held beliefs. Ideology, as it turns out, is an extremely effective marker for predicting risk perception - and more distressingly, these differences in perception grow more pronounced with "high-information" individuals, strongly pointing to the existence of motivated reasoning.

So what does all of this have to do with antagonism? Quite simply: everything. People will by nature rebel against information perceived to be antagonistic to their worldviews - downplaying evidence of phenomena that threatens their worldviews. (Kahan notes how this cuts several ways - both in how the threat of global climate change threatens market-oriented views of individualists and hierachists, and how the associations of nuclear power with "big business" and highly concentrated capital raises the hackles of those of more egalitarian and communitarian mindsets.) These associations are particularly acute when said scientific issues are charged with a single solution - such as in the case of climate, direct government intervention into the economy to regulate carbon dioxide emissions.

One of the more interesting outcomes of some of Kahan's experimental work has been in strategies toward de-polarization - science communication strategies which seek to minimize these perception gaps, namely by presenting scientific information in a way which seeks to minimize antagonism toward deeply-held values.  An example of this depolarization with respect to climate change is of course nuclear energy (along with geo-engineering); when communication of climate risks is presented with policy prescriptions of increased use of nuclear energy or new technologies such as geoengineering, individuals oriented toward skepticism of climate risks become more receptive - in other words, the use of framing has a demonstrable de-polarizing effect. Why? Namely because the science is now presented in a context where it is no longer threatening to the worldview of the listener.

And yet too often in science communication (and at times among nuclear advocates as well) there is the very opposite at work - science is presented as antagonistically as possible to the audience - as if somehow dismissing climate skeptics and religious fundamentalists as stupid and venal will cow them into belief. (Once again, to my horror I have seen the same phenomenon at work in certain discussions over nuclear energy - where those representing the house will shout down any who dare trespass in their domain instead of making any attempt at reasonable engagement.)

The same goes as well for the policies that from the science - absolutist arguments that inherently tie science to one favored set of policies - rather than a panoply of potential solutions. Such strategies are practically an open invitation to partisanship and motivated reasoning, and yet all too often are the standard for how high-profile science communication on controversial issues gets done. (Similarly, attempts to reconcile the idea of science as not being fundamentally incompatible or at odds with various political and religious values are frequently dismissed as at best naive and at worst "selling out" science.) It is in these cases where members of the scientific community in fact become their own worst enemies - namely in hardening an opposition predicated on the idea that certain scientific findings are fundamentally antagonistic to their values (and thus we return to the realm of "dueling PhD's...")

To put it on a meta level for a moment - getting the public to accept the scientific process as a means of understanding the natural world is in essence getting them to agree upon a common source for facts. But the role of science communication is not and should not be a platform for antagonizing whatever misguided metaphysical or theological beliefs the speaker believes the audience has. In other words, science can and should speak to facts and leave issues of metaphysics to others. (Or, to put it yet another way as I did on Twitter - is your goal to change beliefs over scientific facts or religious theology?)

This problem of "dueling PhD's" - or to put it another way, competing certifications on science, and in turn what experts we trust inherently come back to these kinds of issues. Kahan recently posted an interesting four-part essay (drawing heavily on the ideas of Karl Popper) on the notion of a "Liberal Republic of Science" (I, II, III, IV) - discussing how a key issue which arises even in societies which broadly accept science as a foundation of knowledge is in the inevitable conflicts of how we certify these sources of facts - in other words, the dueling PhDs. (Kahan stresses that in his view, much of the current wrangling over hot-button issues like climate, nuclear power, and vaccines is not even a question of who accepts science as a source of knowledge as it is the process of how our values shape whose information we certify as credible - which again, comes back to how this information validates existing value systems. Kahan's argument is thus for a science of science communication.) Ultimately this once again returns to the issue of antagonism - science presented in a way which is directly antagonistic to the values of the listener will be stripped of credibility in favor of information from sources which does not antagonize values. (Thus we get to Kahan's argument for a science of science communication - determining the best means of ensuring the best and most accurate scientific information is received and accepted by the overall public.)

Growing a consensus on science as a source of knowledge (or further, developing a common understanding on the same core set of scientific facts) does not imply unanimity in policy ends (and nor should it!), namely because policy is inherently a normative process. More importantly, dropping an explicitly antagonistic communication strategy in favor of one more easily accommodating to diverse values doesn't it in any way imply "giving in" or "selling out" science (as my position has been rather uncharitably characterized). Above all else, the goal here is to get people recognize a common starting point for facts, and letting the implications - both policy and metaphysical - flow from this common starting point. Getting people to agree to the reality of climate change does not imply unanimity about what to do about it, namely because this inherently involves value judgments over the required trade-offs - and of course the same is true for nuclear energy as well. What it does do however is to ensure a more honest, reasoned, and productive discussion of the available options.

Again, however - this requires a strategy for science communication that inherently puts aside antagonism and focuses upon compatibility with existing values. Two recent posts - one by +Suzanne Hobbs Baker at the ANS Nuclear Cafe and one by +Rod Adams at Atomic Insights fit well into what I'm proposing. Both discuss the role of communicating the value of nuclear energy as a strategy for combating climate change - Suzy within the context of framing nuclear as an ally of environmentalism in the face of climate change, and Rod in regards to how because discussions of climate are often so charged even within pro-nuclear communities that such debates become toxic (and thus are often placed strictly off-limits), thus depriving the nuclear community of a key message in communicating with the public. Both of them are focusing on how presenting nuclear as explicitly compatible with concerns with the environment can perhaps help to potentially forge partnerships from communities skeptical (and even at times adversarial) to one another. (And again, to emphasize - a deep concern over how to rectify doing something about climate change while maintaining our present standard of living is one of the fundamental reasons I decided to change careers...)

This is something that I myself have tried to embrace myself when dealing with audiences hostile to nuclear (such as the NNSA hearing on disposing of surplus weapons plutonium in MOX fuel in Chattanooga, back in September). The very first thing I acknowledged to the audience is that we clearly have disparate opinions about nuclear energy (ones unlikely to be resolved in the span of a single evening) but that everyone in the room shared common concerns over peace and security - our preferred means of achieving this ("...to MOX or not to MOX, that is the question...") simply differed. I'm not so fantastically egotistical as to believe this changed the entire tone of the meeting (there were still certainly rancorous and loud comments by the opposition), but I do sincerely believe starting from a position of common values and as much as possible eschewing antagonism helped to provoke thoughtful discussions which occurred afterwards (and at least some civility during).

None of this implies stepping down antagonism in science communication is a magic-bullet or a panacea, nor will it necessarily work in all cases (such as dealing with perhaps the most hardened zealots - be they of the anti-nuclear or fundamentalist variety...) But what it can do (in fact, what folks like Kahan have explicitly demonstrated when it comes to "compatabalist" communication strategies), is that it can help to detoxify these kinds of discussions, namely by pulling people away from the brink by not threatening their deeper values. That in itself would be progress.

Spent nuclear fuel disposal is not a "subsidy"

One thing that tends to raise my hackles without fail is when the inevitable game of "Name the Energy Subsidy!" comes up, somehow the issue of spent nuclear fuel disposition gets lumped in. Namely because spent fuel management is pretty much the opposite of what is typically thought of as a "subsidy."

To give some background - prior to 1982, the management of spent nuclear fuel was the sole province of nuclear generators. In this regard, coupled with the dual expectation that uranium resources would be relatively scarce and that fast "breeder" reactors would be used to create a virtually inexhaustible source of plutonium-based fuels from non-fissile U-238, the nuclear industry began private-sector arrangements toward chemical reprocessing and recovery of uranium and plutonium from spent fuel. (This still leaves the issue of locating a high-level waste repository for the remaining radioactive materials not recycled, however the mass and volume of said materials would be substantially reduced).

This continued until 1976, when President Ford issued a temporary moratorium on civilian reprocessing of spent fuel, followed by President Carter's (infamous) 1977 executive order permanently banning it, based on international nonproliferation concerns. (Reagan would later reverse this order, but the damage by that time had been done). This came just as plans were underway to by Allied General Nuclear Services open a relatively advanced reprocessing facility in Barnwell, South Carolina. Ford's (and subsequently Carter's) executive orders came after $500-700 million had already been committed to the Barnwell facility. It is one of many sobering lessons in the history of the nuclear industry how mercurial shifts in politics can bring about financial ruin when dealing with capital-intensive investments.

Fast-forward to 1982 - faced with a crisis in managing spent fuel brought about by the sudden halt in the domestic reprocessing industry, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. One of the main provisions of this act is that the federal government assumes the role of locating and constructing a suitable geologic repository for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel. (The subsequent 1987 amendments, termed the "Screw Nevada" bill, amended the 1982 Act, short-circuiting the site selection process to designate Yucca Mountain as the sole candidate site, in part due perceived cost savings by narrowing down the site selection process.)

[As an aside, there are two excellent articles I can recommend to those more interested in a full treatment of the history of how we came to where we are today - the first, "The U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel Policy: Road to Nowhere" by James M. Hylko and Dr. Robert Peltier, PE, which focuses more on the chronology of U.S. high-level waste management, and the second, a recent article in The New Atlantis, "Yucca Mountain: A Post-Mortem" by Adam White, which delves more into the politics of Yucca Mountain.]

However, a key facet of this bill which is often overlooked is the fact that the industry is required to pay for the cost of disposal; specifically, they pay a fee of 1 mil/kWh ($1/MWh) of nuclear electricity generated. In other words, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is by its very nature a "polluter pays" arrangement (which really, is as it should be). To date, the Nuclear Waste Fund has accumulated nearly $30 billion (accounting for accumulated interest), while spending about $8 billion on site characterization for the Yucca Mountain Project. Only in Bizarro-world is a net payment of $22 billion from the utilities (and, by proxy, electricity consumers) to the federal government considered a "subsidy." One can quibble over whether the sum is sufficient - right now the fee generates about $750 million per year - but the fact is, no one's getting a free ride on that front.

So I was somewhat distressed to see the waste "subsidy" canard come up this discussion of energy subsides over at Scholars and Rogues. Specifically, a couple of quotes jumped out at me:

The continuing cost of such temporary storage, and the nearly $100 billion needed for “research, construction and operation of the geologic repository over a 150 year period” at Yucca Mountain, is a subsidy for the nuclear industry.

Fifty-five thousand tons of spent fuel rods, with no permanent home in sight, suggest nuclear subsidies will continue. But before Congress, presumably with White House “cooperation,” ends any energy subsidy, perhaps they’ll take time out from their internecine bickering to actually produce a coherent national energy policy that reflects all available technologies and considers the viability of energy technologies in light of fossil fuel emissions decimating the global climate.

Huh? In what universe is an industry tasked with the responsibility of paying for its own waste disposal (particularly after the utter and repeated failure of the federal government to live up to its contractual obligations with utilities) a "subsidy?" Much of the rest of the article contains some risible arguments about subsidies to the nuclear industry (the value of the Price-Anderson Act is a contentious issue, namely because while it does act as a liability backstop for nuclear accidents, not a single dime has ever been paid out under the act; further is the cross-insurance requirement that literally guarantees "an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere"); however, given that I have a day job, I really didn't feel like debating every single claim. Needless to say though, the issue about calling waste management a "subsidy" struck me as profoundly incorrect.

So, in the spirit of Rod Adams, I left a comment, but I decided to share my comment here as well. (Forgive my long-windedness...)

I will leave the debate over some of the "subsidies" you bring up for others, but there is one major issue I must take issue with - you state the cost of spent nuclear fuel storage is a cost borne by taxpayers (i.e., a subsidy). This is most explicitly not true.

First, the cost of on-site storage is explicitly paid for by the generating utilities (i.e., under the law, this is their obligation) - not the federal government. Second, per the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, nuclear operators have been required to pay a fee of 1 mil/kWh of nuclear electricity generated (i.e., $1/MWh) to cover the costs of geologic disposal. (Per the NWPA, the federal government assumed the responsibility for permanent geologic disposal - in 1987, this was amended to select the Yucca Mountain site.)

In this time, the federal government has collected nearly $30 billion (including accumulated interest) from the utilities to cover the costs of Yucca, with about $8 billion being spent in site characterization. This most certainly does not look like a subsidy in the conventional sense.

One can argue whether the nuclear waste fee is sufficient to cover future costs - at present, the waste fund accumulates about $750 million per year, and will continue to do so as long as the reactor fleet operates. One could likewise argue with your characterization of "no permanent solution" - geologic disposal, by its very nature, is designed to be a "permanent" solution, namely by placing spent fuel in long-term isolation from humans and the environment. And this is not the only waste disposition strategy available - other strategies, like reprocessing to separate out shorter-lived fission products from still-useful actinides can both substantially reduce waste volume and the overall long-term radioactivity (i.e., the actinides, like Pu and other fissionable heavy metals, are the majority of the "long tail" of radioactivity in spent fuel - nearly all of the rest is gone after around 300 years). However, I would also point out that it was political decisions by the federal government in the 1970s that ended U.S. reprocessing efforts being undertaken by private industry - and thus left the federal government in the role of assuming responsibility for spent fuel disposal.

Overall though, the fact that the nuclear industry is responsible for paying its own way with regards to spent fuel disposal significantly undercuts the argument that this constitutes a "subsidy" in any form.

Meanwhile, what other energy sector requires that hazardous wastes be so methodically isolated from humankind until the end of time? Certainly coal ash has toxic heavy metals (lead and mercury) which never become less toxic, as do older generations of photovoltaic cells. I don't say this to diminish the challenge in responsibly managing nuclear waste, but rather to point out that this is a more universal problem - the only difference is that nuclear is the only sector actually held to account for this negative externality, including paying for the actual costs of permanent disposal.

Does nuclear lack a natural constituency?

A quick Turing test from the prior round of U.S. presidential debates - see if you can spot the speaker:

We have increased oil production to the highest levels in 16 years. Natural gas production is the highest it's been in decades. We have seen increases in coal production and coal employment.

Look, I want to make sure we use our oil, our coal, our gas, our nuclear, our renewables. I believe very much in our renewable capabilities; ethanol, wind, solar will be an important part of our energy mix.

Number three, we've got to control our own energy. Now, not only oil and natural gas, which we've been investing in; but also, we've got to make sure we're building the energy source of the future, not just thinking about next year, but ten years from now, 20 years from now. That's why we've invested in solar and wind and biofuels, energy efficient cars.

Let's take advantage of the energy resources we have, as well as the energy sources for the future. And if we do that, if we do what I'm planning on doing, which is getting us energy independent, North America energy independence within eight years, you're going to see manufacturing jobs come back. Because our energy is low cost, that are already beginning to come back because of our abundant energy.

In order: Obama, Romney, Obama, Romney. Most notably, while the word "energy" showed up 40 times during last Tuesday's debate, "nuclear" showed up only twice (and only once in the context of energy, within the throwaway line given by Governor Romney above). Compare and contrast with coal (22 appearances), natural gas (8 appearances), oil (26 times), wind (7 times), and solar (3 times).

It is consistently puzzling how an energy source which supplies about 20% of U.S. baseload electricity and the overwhelming share of its carbon-free energy portfolio manages scarce mention in debates over energy. Instead we have two candidates practically tripping over themselves to extol the virtues of increased fossil fuel production (which, depending on your constituency, will sometimes include a nod to chimerical "clean coal" or carbon sequestration technology) but who can barely suffer more than an obligatory mention of nuclear.

It isn't because either candidate seems particularly hostile to nuclear (at least, not openly); both have quietly supported nuclear, generally in the context of "all of the above" energy policies which differ primarily in the respective weight given to fossil exploration and renewables. It would seem, as I have often asserted, in a world both where energy scarcity and environmental impacts of energy are at the forefront, opposition to nuclear is a self-marginalizing position. So why it is exactly that it fails to merit more than passing mention? Consensus doesn't seem to be it; if the above ideological Turing test is any indication, both Obama and Romney seem intent upon defying traditional expectations by endorsing (however insincerely) traditionally-favored energy resources of their opponents. (As a result, we have such scintillating "debates" as to which candidate really loves fossil exploration more...)

The superficial answer commonly given in response to this of course would be that fossil interests (and perhaps, by proxy, renewables, if one is the conspiratorial type) represent tremendous financial interests, and thus, political interests. But this explanation only goes so far - particularly when one looks to polling data as to how energy preferences break down within the public.

Rather, I am inclined to wonder if this is a case of where nuclear, unlike fossil and rewnewables, lacks a well-defined constituency - being relegated to a tepid, forgotten center (where it enjoys broad, lukewarm support by many and hot, focused opposition at the fringe). It is perhaps progress (and a keen awareness of the urgency brought on both by the need for action on climate change and developing abundant future energy resources) that nuclear is no longer seen as ideologically confined to the rightward end of the political spectrum; but instead I am forced to once again go back to the hypothesis that we are seeing energy as a marker for pre-existing cultural affinities.

To wit - for all of the talk by both Romney and Obama on developing coal resources, does either seriously expect to see any significant new developments in coal-fired electrical capacity? (A telling example of the direction of things to come is TVA's shuttering of the John Sevier coal plant, which was recently replaced by a combined-cycle natural gas facility. In a single year, TVA's coal portfolio has shifted down from around 50% to 30% - with the gap entirely being made up for by gas.) Even if one does believe new coal-fired generation will emerge, does either seriously believe this will emerge when projected costs for so-called "clean coal" outstrip the production costs of new nuclear?

Or, more importantly, if support for nuclear was more than token for both candidates, why is it exactly than in Romney's 21-page energy plan, the proposals for nuclear come down to a single bullet point: "Revitalize nuclear power by equipping the NRC to approve new designs and to license approved reactor designs on approved sites within two years." (How this will be accomplished is left as an exercise for the reader). Note the striking absence of any mention of small modular reactors and their potential to revitalize export-driven manufacturing in the U.S., or even such basic measures as reforming antiquated laws restricting vitally-needed foreign investment in new domestic nuclear capacity - nuclear, it would seem, is an afterthought. Nor is it any better with Obama, where his campaign's "issues" site for energy lists oil exploration and (inexplicably) clean coal (one gets the feeling we're actually back in the Bush years), but fails to even mention nuclear.

The very fact that the Romney campaign would speak effusively of renewables as an improbable part of a vague, "all-of-the-above" energy strategy while Obama bafflingly promotes both fossil exploration and dubious "clean coal" technology (see also, vaporware) point to an effort to reach voters not on the rational basis of carefully-considered energy policy, but rather, in a word, pandering. (Yes, quel surprise indeed coming from a political campaign).

So why is this? Because again, by and large for the public, I am largely convinced that support for particular energy sources comes not from their practical value but from what these represent. It is immaterial as to whether availability and diffusivity inherently limit the ability of renewables to produce electricity at the large, consistent scales required to power modern civilization - because these sources, at their core, represent aspirational goods which somehow magically disconnect environmental consequences from energy. Fossil resources represent abundance - an energy abundance which can be found here at home, supporting an economic fantasy of "energy independence" powered by domestic, low-cost energy sources (to which environmental concerns are ancillary).

What brings this charade crashing down is the dissonance with how each of these sides deals with the issue of nuclear. If the latter camp truly cared about abundance, nuclear would plausibly be of co-equal priority - uranium resources are relatively abundant in the U.S., and most of the uranium it imports are from friendly countries like our neighbors to the north. Further, nuclear is relatively cheap - particularly once plants are built - and those plants can supply energy for entire generations at tiny marginal costs. Thus, if it was simply about energy abundance, one would expect more than simple tepid support - one should see more folks like Lamar Alexander exhorting the country to double our current fleet by building a hundred new nuclear reactors. But they don't. Instead we are given platitudes extolling the virtues of abundant natural gas and coal - not uranium.

Meanwhile, as to the former crowd that values minimizing environmental impacts, it is immaterial as to what backs up intermittent sources (i.e., it's the same resources in which they claim they are attempting to displace). If the plausible goal were to eliminate CO2 and air pollution as much as possible, one would think that nuclear, given its high capacity and availability, would be at the vanguard of the movement. And yet it is shockingly absent - instead, once again, natural gas and ephemeral promises of "clean coal" (which, in fairness, is probably more about a cynical electoral sop to coal-producing states than it is a serious policy proposal) take the fore. Constantly we hear from these same people theoretically devoted to the cause of creating a clean energy future about the virtue and necessity of natural gas as a "bridge" fuel - as if carbon-free nuclear energy simply did not exist. (Or as if natural gas did not pose a far more substantial risk in terms of deaths per unit energy produced).

What nuclear seems to lack here is the existence of a natural constituency  Again, look at what a rational examination of the expressed interests of our two major constituencies above should theoretically produce - nuclear, by all accounts, should be a hands-down consensus winner. Yet instead it is relegated to scarcely a mention in high-profile debates.

Again, it is far better for nuclear not to exist solely in the thrall of one ideological pole, given the ease at which it can be marginalized on a partisan basis. But perhaps the bigger issue now is that nuclear, enjoying a broad but shallow public consensus, finds itself politically homeless.

A cost-free way to open up nuclear investment

Late last week, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) rejected a license application for the proposed Calvert Cliffs Unit 3 (an AREVA EPR) build in Southern Maryland. The reason? It was against the law.

Specifically, when the build was originally proposed, it was to be a 50/50 joint ownership stake by Constellation Energy and Electricite de France (EDF, the state-owned French utility giant). However, in November 2010, Constellation sold its 50% stake in the reactor to EDF, making it the sole potential owner of the unit.

According to Federal law (10 CFR 50.38), foreign investors are ineligible to apply for a license to operate a nuclear facility in the U.S. While Unistar was still the nominal applicant, the ASLB determined that the venture was solely owned by EDF and thus EDF was the effective applicant - and thus, ineligible. (The lawsuit, incidentally, was filed by the anti-nuclear activist group NIRS, indicating that anti-nuclear groups will not hesitate use every tool at their disposal to block or shut down any nuclear power facility - and to hell with the cost to the environment as a result.)

If this seems entirely backward in a world of global production and investment, that's because it is. The current regulation is an artifact of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which first authorized private ownership of nuclear facilities. (Prior to this - per the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, all nuclear technology was considered a state secret, during the short time in which the U.S. enjoyed a monopoly on the technology.)

Is there any real compelling reason for restrictions on foreign ownership and investment in nuclear facilities to exist at a time when the U.S. holding a monopoly on the technology has long since passed? Issues of safety here of course are irrelevant - the facilities would be licensed and regulated by the NRC, just as any other nuclear facility is now. About the only salient objection is the political one - i.e., the implications of a foreign entity maintaining controlling ownership in key infrastructure. (Although it's hard to see anyone getting particularly upset about the reverse - U.S. entities owning a controlling stake in infrastructure in other nations.)

For those who have a bit of a longer memory, the controversy should ring familiar - i.e., it's the same arguments which were played out during the Dubai Ports World deal, in which DP World, a UAE-based company, would take over management contracts for six U.S. ports already under foreign management.

Meanwhile, an issue to consider is the fact that bringing together capital to complete a construction bid like Calvert Cliffs 3 is no mean feat (particularly in an economy where investors seem all too skittish about long-term investments in energy infrastructure). Given the difficulty then, it seems positively insane for any political leadership to turn away large investments in long-term energy infrastructure (especially non-emitting baseload like nuclear, which has a long expected operational lifetime).

Setting aside the politics of free trade for a moment, if Republicans have any seriousness behind their twin rhetoric of advocating for expanded use of nuclear energy and in relying on the free market to sort out our energy mix, then this one should be a no-brainer: let companies like EDF put up the investment and apply for a license. The same is true for Democrats as well - if they're serious about both jobs (nuclear construction has them in spades) and especially about creating clean energy sources for the future, investors like EDF should be welcomed with open arms, not turned away at the door.

Again, the best part of this? This costs nothing. Investors like EDF wish to voluntarily invest their money in a vital public good (carbon-free electricity) - all that needs to happen is for leaders to be willing to say, "Oui."

Cultural signaling and energy

An image that struck me recently and has stayed with me since was a license plate. Specifically, a jet-black Kentucky license plate, emblazoned "Friends of Coal."

The first thing that ran through my mind was, "Who in their right mind proudly trumpets supporting that?" It struck me as about the same contrarian attitude as waving around a Confederate flag (or its more common contemporary, sporting a Confederate flag bumper sticker; which again, some people actually do that). These are things that, to an uninitiated Midwestern exile like myself, should seem embarrassing to display, to say the least.

Yet, oddly enough, much like the confederate flag paraphernalia one encounters with depressing frequency south of the Mason-Dixon line, Kentucky's "Friends of Coal" license plate is the state's most popular custom license plate design - more popular than veteran's plates and those supporting the University of Kentucky. As it turns out, several other states in the area have their own variations, including Virginia and West Virginia.

Obviously, coal is a major economic player in Appalachia, so strong support is to be expected. But the image in my mind started making me think about a broader issue in energy politics, and perhaps why it seems why so often it seems like there are two sides talking past one another (where, incidentally, nuclear tends to be neglected in the crossfire). Specifically, a part of me wonders if what one sees in trends of public support for various energy sources has to do with the economic phenomenon of "signaling" behavior.

I've of course speculated about how cultural perceptions might play a role in public opinion over energy sources numerous times before, but what struck me here was whether support for energy sources - and specifically, some of the most stark divides that manifest - are perhaps deeper expressions of the cultural and aspirational values of the proponents, trumping factors including economics and environmental considerations (as well as basic issues of numeracy).

To back up a bit - in economics parlance, "signaling" is usually used as a way which people convey information which can't always be directly inferred or observed. Signaling can exist both in the banal, uncontroversial sense - wearing a suit and tie signals conformity, particular conformity to societal expectations of professional behavior - to somewhat more contested areas (such as whether higher education acts as a signal to employers as to characteristics including intelligence, diligence, or again, conformity).

Thus, my hypothesis - I am left to wonder if strong, highly polarized opinions on energy sources - particularly on divides such as coal (and to a lesser degree, natural gas) as well as wind and solar don't perhaps serve as signaling "stand-ins" for statements of individual values and cultural affinity.

In particular, the coal industry has capitalized on this in a particularly effective way, with their "America's power" re-branding, and in particular attempting to link coal exclusively to the idea of low-cost, reliable energy generation (again, despite the fact that the levelized costs of nuclear, with its capital costs folded in, are not wildly out of line with coal, particularly if carbon capture and sequestration is a mandated component.) Coal is, in effect, a signal of working-class values, and in particular an expression of solidarity with the working-class communities typically associated with coal-mining.

In a less regionally confined sense, one has to wonder whether some of the pushback from the right over President Obama's "War on Fossil Fuels" also has more to do with outward expressions of cultural affiliation than it does practical concerns over energy. (Nevermind that favoring one fossil source over another hardly consistutes a "war" on fossil fuels). Consider if you will how often right-wing pundits complain about how curtailing fossil fuel use for electricity would spike energy prices - again, as if nuclear energy weren't supplying a fifth of our electricity at the lowest marginal cost of baseload production next to hydro.

I can't help but feel like the effect is intentional - although perhaps not for the reasons folks like Rod Adams might assert (i.e., no, this is not a fossil-fueled conspiracy). Instead, look to the numbers - while support for nuclear energy is strong among self-identified Republicans, it trails far behind support for exploration of new fossil sources. Ultimately, one has to wonder if such public rending of garments pertains more to a cultural push-back response - rallying around fossil sources because of perceptions of the other - and less about actual, considered evaluation of economic and environmental trade-offs of different energy sources.

Contrast this with renewables - support for renewables is much like recycling - a token expression of environmental concern which can be done for minimal required effort. It is, in essence, expressing support for the environment without actually requiring any kind of substantial commitment from the individual. Considerations such as reliability of supply, economics, or even sheer scale are immaterial - support for renewables is, in essence, "green cred." Among the more radicalized, the inherent limitations of renewables are even considered a feature, not a bug - the limited capacity and availability of renewables are an exhortation to consume less, and ultimately to de-industrialize. In either case, support for renewables is less about the practical reality of the enormous challenge in powering an industrial society at the whims of nature and more about the value expression (or, as it were, aspiration) that it entails.

This process playing out prominently on the campaign trail right now. In Iowa, President Obama blasted Mitt Romney for his support of allowing a wind power production tax credit to expire. Meanwhile, Mitt Romney and his supporters have been slugging back, contending that Obama has been waging a "war on coal." (Note as well the targeted blue-collar audience.)

One can easily see where this one is going. Orphaned from any such discussions is nuclear; something at least now (mercifully) given tepid support by both sides, if only because excluding nuclear from energy discussions on the grounds of both environmental and economics grounds is inherently a politically self-marginalizing position, even if it doesn't seem to command strong feelings among most.

So what does support for nuclear energy signal, if you will (and likewise, its opposition)? I would hypothesize that the dividing line for nuclear turns on issues of technological optimism and energy abundance. A common thread I have observed among many nuclear professionals and advocates is a belief that the technology can consistently be made cheaper, more abundant, and ever safer. In particular among these people - myself included - is a belief in the imperative of energy abundance (this in fact was part of the reason I became a nuclear engineer). By contrast, nuclear opponents are frequently (although not always) in the opposite role - sometimes technological pessimists and with a shocking frequency advocates of energy austerity - believing that the answer always is to consume less (despite the unmistakable positive correlations between prosperity and energy consumption, namely due to what energy enables us to do in modern society).

I remark that nuclear opponents are not always technological pessimists, namely because one occasionally encounters the odd nuclear opponent with delusional beliefs about the capability of renewables - although almost universally they fall back to the position of energy austerity when the limitations of renewable sources are brought up.

What do you think? Is energy advocacy a marker for more deeply-held cultural values? And if so, what does a strong preference for nuclear indicate?

Aside: On a personal note, I hope to be back to more regular blogging soon; this month I started out as a new faculty in the Nuclear Engineering department at the University of Tennessee, and suffice to say, the life of a new faculty can at times be... overwhelming.

Questions for MacFarlane

Dr. MacFarlane (Image: George Mason University)

The nomination of Allison MacFarlane has drawn a considerably mixed reaction among the nuclear community, ranging from NEI's rather speedy endorsement and Rod Adams' similarly rapid denouncement. Others (including myself) have chosen to withhold judgment for the time being, although I do recomend Margaret Harding's list of desirable qualities in a potential NRC chair.

Given that MacFarlane's hearing before the Senate Environment and Public Works committee is scheduled for tomorrow, here are some questions which I believe would better inform the discussion both of whether MacFarlane is a good candidate to lead the NRC and what her leadership might entail.

NRC & Leadership

1. Given the size and relative impact of the NRC, it is not an agency known for its amenability to on-the-job leadership training. A particular concern is in your lack of organizational leadership experience on your resume. Why do you believe you are qualified to lead the NRC, and what leadership qualities do you believe you bring to the table?
2. Describe what you feel are the key challenges currently facing the NRC. What areas would you focus on as chair, and how would you work to overcome them?
3. Your attitudes appear to have evolved from being a self-described "nuclear agnostic" to indicating that "we absolutely need" nuclear energy with respect to climate change. What provoked this evolution?
4. A prominent concern regarding your appointment to the chairmanship of the NRC is that your background has generally not focused on nuclear fuel cycle technology per se. How do you believe you can overcome this experience gap?
5. Much of the NRC's policy comes down to producing an appropriate balance of safety with economic considerations in regulation. Please describe your thinking on what constitutes socially acceptable risks. Should the safety threshold for nuclear energy systems be higher than other commonly accepted risks, such as air travel? What about in comparison to other energy sources?
   
6. A decision which has been roundly criticized by many nuclear experts was outgoing Chairman Jazcko's unilateral decision to establish a 50-mile evacuation zone for U.S. residents in Japan, contrary to both existing U.S. evacuation guidelines and the Japanese evacuation guidelines. Do you agree with this decision? If so, upon what basis? If not, where did the Chairman err and how would you handle the situation differently?

Nuclear Waste Management

1. As an outspoken critic of Yucca Mountain, both on technical and procedural grounds, how do you view the decision by your predecessor Gregory Jazcko, along with President Obama and Secretary Chu to terminate the licensing review process in light of amendments to the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act which legally mandate Yucca Mountain as the nation's sole geologic repository? Would you allow the licensing process to move forward? If not, how then do you square this under existing federal law?
2. One of your significant contributions to the Blue Ribbon Commission was a strong focus upon a more consent-based process of involving communities in the repository licesing process. What do you view as the NRC's role the siting process for a potential repository (if any)?
3. What immediate actions (if any) do you believe the federal government should take with respect to spent fuel management?

Nonproliferation

1. Your academic background includes several publications on the topic of nuclear nonproliferation policy. In particular, you have publicly stated your opposition to spent fuel reprocessing on nonproliferation grounds. Do you believe President Carter's decision to suspend civil reprocessing in the United States was ultimately effective in achieving its stated nonproliferation goals?
2. How do these nonproliferation concerns relate to the NRC's recent license to GE to construct a laser enrichment test facility, given similar nonproliferation concerns?
3. Please describe why you believe reprocessing of reactor-grade plutonium to be a viable proliferation concern, particularly in nuclear weapons states.
4. What role (if any) do you see for the NRC in establishing U.S. nonproliferation policy?

Licensing and new construction

1. A particular challenge to the development of novel reactor concepts such as small modular reactors as well as entirely new reactor concepts such as TerraPower's traveling wave reactor has been the difficulty in getting such designs through the NRC licesning process. In particular, this has been described as a "chicken-and-egg" problem, with the NRC refusing to prioritize designs with no present commercial interest, while utilities are generally only interested in designs that are expected to receive NRC review. As a result, some designers - such as TerraPower - plan on circumventing the U.S. market entirely. What do you believe the NRC should do to address this issue?
2. Nuclear experts such as Rod Adams have pointed out that the existing COL process relies on the assumption that no amendments to the design will need to be made after construction begins. Does this process need to be improved? If so, how would you propose improving it?
3. Departing chairman Jazcko was frequently the lone dissenter on several recent votes for involving reactor licensing and construction, including the construction licenses for Vogtle and VC Sumner reactors as well as the recent 20-year license extension for the Pilgrim nuclear facility. Do you believe Jazcko's dissenting votes were justified? If so, on what grounds? If not, how would you approach the situation differently?

What questions would you ask MacFarlane, given the chance?

Update: Margaret Harding presents her own list of questions, and Rod Adams posts a transcript of his 2007 interview with Dr. MacFarlane in which she declares herself as an "atomic agnostic."

Update II: Jack Spencer at Heritage's blog similarly poses his questions. Some substantial overlap in themes arises - particularly over issues such as Yucca Mountain and new reactor licensing.

A closer look at Jazcko's replacement

Dr. MacFarlane

Earlier this week, embattled NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko announced he would be stepping down from his position contingent upon the confirmation of his replacement. Wasting no time, the Obama administration announced their nominee today, a mere three days after Jaczko's announcement. Their candidate? Dr. Allison MacFarlane, an associate professor of Environmental Science and Policy at George Mason University.

MacFarlane is not without technical credentials - she holds a Ph.D. in geology from MIT and has written extensively on nuclear waste management issues - in particular, serving on the recent Blue Ribbon Commission. And, unlike the departing Chairman, MacFarlane at least has an academic career to point to, rather than solely being employed as a political aide for entire career. Ideologically however, she is relatively aligned with the departing Chariman however - thus, while not quite Gregory Jaczko II: Electric Boogaloo, she is likely close enough for government work.

A mixed bag

Suffice it to say, MacFarlane's ideological interests represent a mixed bag, to say the least. In many of her writings concerning the siting process for a nuclear waste repository, MacFarlane has repeatedly pointed to the need for a consent-based process (like that used for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant [WIPP] in New Mexico) for locating a disposal facility, something which has been repeatedly stressed by other nuclear professionals (including myself). Thus, her influence over the Blue Ribbon Commission's final report is quite obvious.

On the other hand, MacFarlane has been extremely critical of spent fuel reprocessing along with being a tenacious opponent of Yucca Mountain itself; she, along with Frank Von Hippel of Princeton have repeatedly advocated plutonium immobilization of surplus stocks of reactor-grade plutonium from civil reprocessing programs, as well as for weapons-grade plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads. Needless to say, this is an incredibly wasteful and inefficient waste management solution. (It is thus perhaps unsurprising then, given her influence, that the BRC final report also declined to endorse reprocessing as a policy solution for spent nuclear fuel.)

MacFarlane couches her objections chiefly in terms of nonproliferation concerns (something which I have an academic specialty in); what is not clearly demonstrated in any of her analysis is how reactor-grade plutonium (itself not suitable for direct use in weapons, due to heat-producing impurities such as Pu-240 and Pu-242 which make for sub-optimal weapons materials - more on this in a moment) represents a viable proliferation concern, particularly in nuclear weapons states such as the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the United States.

The exception here to this trend is of course Japan, which currently reprocesses fuel and ultimately aspires to achieve a fully "closed" fuel cycle for reasons of resource independence. However, even absent a reprocessing program, their world-class leadership in nuclear technology means that they are hardly constrained on a technical basis from developing a weapons program. (Japan is quintessentially a "screwdriver's turn" from nuclear weapons capability.) Yet given their deep cultural aversion to nuclear weapons, Japan is in fact a leading figure in the international nonproliferation community.

All of this said, MacFarlane herself has gone on the record of indicating the she personally does not oppose nuclear energy itself, arguing that in the face of climate change, we "absolutely need nuclear power." Again, very much a mixed bag, so to speak.

The two faces of the nonproliferation community

Much of MacFarlane's background has been associated with what I term the "political" wing of the nonproliferation community - the other being the "technical" side (where my background is from). Her affiliations include the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard (not exactly a hotbed of pro-nuclear activity or solid technical analysis at that), home of well-known academic nuclear critic Matthew Bunn, as well as being a regular co-author with Frank Von Hippel (someone also not known for his warm feelings for nuclear energy - although a perfectly pleasant person in real life.)

Nonproliferation tends to get a poor reputation among nuclear professionals and advocates, precisely due to the "political" wing, who tend to focus on opposing any nuclear technology seen as "proliferant," which in turn lends itself to the anti-nuclear strategy of "bottle-necking" - in other words, "constipate" the nuclear fuel cycle and then complain loudly of the "lack of solutions" for nuclear waste (despite the plethora of available technical options).

Conversely, the "technical" nonproliferation community tends to focus on aspects such as how to improve aspects of verification and measurement within fuel cycle facilities - in other words, ensuring that declarations of sensitive facilities are complete and accurate and that material is fully accounted for. An example of this includes projects like those I am currently working on, which seek to use radiation detectors to better characterize the isotopic contents of spent nuclear fuel in order to provide for a superior accounting of materials such as plutonium. The difference in focus thus could not be more stark - one side complaining of the potential problems and the other seeking solutions to improve facilities such to eliminate said problems.

Ultimately, these kinds of debates come back to the question I frequently ask: "So what's your alternative?" To her credit, MacFarlane at least does offer an alternative solution - one I find to be highly flawed, but it is nonetheless out there. And again, likewise to her credit, MacFarlane does not declare herself to be outright opposed to nuclear energy. Thus, the problem is simply a matter of coming to an agreement on a better solution for nuclear waste management.

A small background on "weapons-usable"

So-called "weapons-grade" plutonium contains more than 90% Pu-239 - the isotope most suitable for weapons use (given its low spontaneous fission rate and low heat generation rate). Even-numbered plutonium isotopes - Pu-238, Pu-240, and Pu-242 - tend to have a high heat generation rate (Pu-238 has such a high heat generation rate from alpha decay that it is frequently used as a power source for space missions such as the Cassini-Hugyens probe which took spectacular images of Saturn and the New Horizons probe currently en route to Pluto). Pu-240 and Pu-242 also have a high level of spontaneous fission, which means in addition to producing large amounts of heat they produce high levels of neutrons - in a weapon, this leads to unpredictable yield, or "fizzle." Thus, generally speaking, "reactor grade" plutonium, while usable in the strictest sense (i.e., one can construct a fission chain reaction using the materials), they are far from optimal for a national weapons effort - any nation with the capability of reprocessing would easily choose a more dedicated route (i.e., with separate plutonium-production reactors to produce high-purity Pu-239 and separate reprocessing facilities) before resorting to diverting civilian stocks.

Political calculations - the "twofer"

So why did Obama tap MacFarlane? Two reasons are likely in play. The first of course is that given her prior criticisms of Yucca Mountain, her nomination has been bolstered by the support of Senate Majority Leader and infamous Yucca Mountain opponent Senator Harry Reid (D-NV). Second, her nomination comes on the heels of President Obama's renomination of current Commissioner Kristine Svinicki. Thus it is likely the Obama Administration is seeking a "twofer," seeking to align the confirmation of Svinicki with that of MacFarlane as a "package deal." Senate Republicans are unlikely to object to Svinicki, who has enjoyed the support of the nuclear community given her extensive expertise in nuclear issues. (And indeed, even NEI has been pushing this strategy of jointly confirming the two nominees.)

The nomination of MacFarlane as chair may also be a concession to Reid and other anti-nuclear Senate Democrats in another sense - Senator Reid has complained (without substantial basis) of Svinicki's record on the NRC - a rather questionable position, given Svinicki has generally voted with her three other commissioners on many important issues (in other words, it would seem that Reid's criticism, and in particular singling out Svinicki, is mostly upon the grounds of several prominent 4-1 votes in which Chairman Jaczko stood alone).

However, his grumbling appears to be muted in a press release similar to that of NEI, stating:

I continue to have grave concerns about Kristine Svinicki’s record on the Commission. But I believe the best interests of the public would be served by moving the nominations of Dr. Macfarlane and Ms. Svinicki together before Ms. Svinicki’s term expires at the end of June, to ensure that we have a fully functioning NRC. Republicans claim to share that goal, and I hope they will work with us to make it a reality.

The smart money will thus likely be on a joint appointment deal hammered out sometime this summer.

And as for Yucca Mountain? I still wouldn't bet on it.

Minding the (partisan) gap: partisan divisions in support for nuclear

Via NEI's twitter feed comes this story of a new Gallup poll on energy and environmental issues similar to that released by Pew which I dissected a few weeks ago.

Image via Gallup

For the most part, the trends are indeed quite similar - especially in the respect that public opinion on the issue of nuclear energy appears to be quite "sticky," consistently polling at a slight majority of Americans favoring its continued use (and even expansion). Unsurprisingly, support for the expanded use of nuclear energy is riven by partisan divides, with much broader numbers of Republicans favoring its expansion over Democrats.

Indeed, this partisan fissure is consistent with Pew's prior polling, with Democrats and Democratic-leaning voters strongly favoring measures including more stringent environmental regulations and more funding for alternative sources such as wind and solar, with much weaker support for the development of new nuclear or fossil fuel exploration. (Interestingly, support for new nuclear among Democrats is weaker than that of opening up federal lands for oil exploration.)

The Republican side naturally shows the inverse, with Republicans generally favoring policies to expand energy supplies (with the relative strength of support for opening up additional land for oil exploration as Democrats show for conservation and regulatory measures). A notable difference in this poll is much stronger support among Republicans for expanding nuclear energy, being the second-favorite choice among Republicans and Republican-leaners at 64% of respondents favoring, compared to 54% in the similar Pew poll.

	% in favor
	National Adults	Republicans	Democrats
Setting higher emissions and pollution standards for business and industry	70	54	85
Spending more government money on developing solar and wind power	69	51	84
Spending government money to develop alternate sources of fuel for automobiles	66	51	81
Imposing mandatory controls on carbon dioxide emissions/other greenhouse gases	65	50	82
Opening up land owned by the federal government for oil exploration	65	84	49
More strongly enforcing federal environmental regulations	64	47	80
Setting higher auto emissions standards for automobiles	62	49	76
Expanding the use of nuclear energy	52	64	41

Getting back to the issue of "stickiness" in public opinion, while support for expanding nuclear has been steadily growing among Republicans since the early 2000s, among Democrats support appears to be stuck around 40%, after briefly spiking around 2006 (incidentally, around the time of Al Gore's most famous work, An Inconvenient Truth was released).

Given the need to develop new domestic sources of energy and the general drive to phase out dirtier sources like coal, it provokes a nagging question - why such a stark partisan divide over one of the largest clean energy sources in the U.S. by share of electricity (around 20%)? Indeed, it's one thing to expect broad divisions overall (given the relative weight individuals assign to factors such as economics, waste management, safety, and so forth). And indeed, some of the split will be driven by familiarity with energy sources overall (i.e., the feasibility, not to mention practicality of providing electricity from intermittent sources at the caprice of nature). An of course, splits along other lines are perhaps more obvious manifestations of priorities - take the split over fossil exploration. But what explains nuclear?

One explanation (which I will cover in a follow-on post) is the influence of cultural factors - specifically, cultural factors which influence risk perception. There is an entire field of study devoted to this, such as the Cultural Cognition Project at the Yale Law School. Ultimately what it boils down to is that how individuals perceive risk and respond to new information is dramatically influenced by their value systems. And, perhaps unsurprisingly, the same patterns of values which tend to divide liberals and conservatives also tend to divide across issues such as the perceived risk of nuclear energy production (along with related issues, such as nuclear waste management).

However, this can cut both ways as well, a matter which should be of key interest to those committed to action on global climate change. A teaser for next time - one particularly interesting finding is those of value persuasions typically found in conservatives that if expanded use of nuclear energy is presented as a necessary solution to global climate change, these individuals become more open to evidence of the risks of climate change, as compared to greater regulatory control over industrial activity - precisely due to the issues of concordance of values. Food for thought.

Not all energy is fungible - and it matters

Via the NYT Green blog comes a new survey by the Pew Center indicating that a smaller majority of Americans now prefer further federal funding of research into alternative energy technologies (specifically, wind, solar, and hydrogen) as a priority over additional exploration of oil and gas supplies. If the comparison seems to be a bit of a misnomer, then you've already caught on to the idea that not all energy, as we have it now, is fungible. Generally speaking, unless you are one of the very fortunate Americans who can afford an electric vehicle (with extremely generous taxpayer support at that), what is being posed is a false dichotomy. All the windmills and solar panels in the world do extremely little to curb demand for oil (and to a lesser extent, natural gas, which may also stand in as a transportation fuel).

Being generous to the poll, one can suppose some confusion arises over the fact that natural gas has been largely responsible for electricity capacity additions within the last decade in the U.S. Still then, one wonders why nuclear energy is excluded from the choice provided.

Public support of expanded nuclear energy production (adapted from Pew)

Digging deeper into the survey, nuclear does show up; what it reveals further highlights the dichotomy illustrated above. Despite rising energy prices overall (both at the pump and in the retail electricity sector), public support clearly shows a disconnect when it comes to fossil fuel exploration versus electricity production. In general, nuclear energy is still recovering in terms of public opinion one year later following the Great Tōhoku Earthquake and tsunami and resulting nuclear crisis at Fukushima.

Public support for off-shore oil drilling, from Pew

What is perhaps revealing is to contrast this to the trend in public opinion on offshore oil drilling following the Deepwater Horizon blowout and massive spill in the Gulf of Mexico - something much closer to home. Unlike nuclear energy, public opinion has generally settled back into its prior setting (enjoying broad majority support) within less than two years, with large majorities favoring expanded offshore oil drilling. While favorable opinion on nuclear expansion appears to recovering, it is still unlikely to achieve the broad support that offshore oil exploration has - again, despite the very visible risks of the latter.

Perhaps also noteworthy is the relative "stickiness" of public opinion - one observes that following a high-profile event (e.g., Deep Water Horizon or Fukushima), public opinion eventually gravitates back to its historical average, implying relatively firmly entrenched opinion with a handful of the public being swayed by major events.

Public support for increased federal funding for alternative
energy research, from Pew

For comparison, Pew also evaluated public opinion of increased financing for alternative energy sources, including solar, wind, and hydrogen. Interestingly, public support for such increased financing has been on a slow decline; thus, in spite of the lede in the New York Times blog that this is somehow a newly emerging phenomenon compared to conventional sources, it is a process which appears to have been dragging on for some time. Indeed, the trend appears to have begun well before high-profile events such as the Solyndra bankruptcy and resulting scandal; while public support slowly continues to drop afterwards, the decline began well before this and continues steadily afterwards. It is difficult to speculate what one may take away from this other than the fact that if the Republican nomination fight is any sign, Americans are notoriously fickle, constantly in search of an appealing hypothetical alternative which simply does not exist.

Weekly average retail gasoline prices (all grades), via EIA

Why the quicker"snap back" in public opinion (or faster-acting amnesia, if you prefer) for oil and gas exploration, in particular? A likely culprit is the higher visibility of rising fuel prices (directly connected with the price of oil); particularly strong is the correlation between public support for oil and gas exploration and the price at the pump. 

Average retail electricity prices, from EIA

Retail prices for electricity have also been on the rise, but such a rise has been much more of a slow creep; with the average rising slowly over a matter of months rather than weeks. Plausibly, electricity consumption is perhaps seen as something consumers can exert some degree of influence over, be it through conservation or efficiency improvements, while demand for gasoline is relatively fixed (at least with respect to workplace commuting).

Meanwhile, yet another interesting artifact comes out of the Pew poll: a breakdown of support for various energy policies by self-identified party, with some of the highlights as follows:

	% in favor
	Rep	Dem	Ind
Allowing more oil & gas drilling in U.S. waters	89	50	64
Giving tax cuts for oil & gas exploration	61	38	42
Promoting the increased use of nuclear power	54	37	45
Requiring better fuel efficiency for vehicles	67	88	77
Spending more on mass transit	52	74	67
More federal funding for alt. energy research	52	81	70

What the above data puts to lie is the myth that members of either major political party are interested in an "all-of-the-above" energy strategy, something frequently invoked as a toll to political correctness (by countless nuclear advocates included) but not reflecting anyone's actual opinions. Indeed, among self-identified Republicans, while a much larger number favor nuclear energy expansion compared to Democrats, it is still a far less popular option than most scenarios involving either the development of additional fossil fuel resources or extension of existing supplies (i.e., fuel efficiency mandates). With respect to Democrats, overwhelming majorities seem to place their faith in measures such as conservation (including vehicle efficiency) and alternative energy research, particularly compared to the use of nuclear energy (again, issues of numeracy be damned). Only self-described independents might be considered to favor an "all of the above" strategy, although their support of such is divided at best.

In other words, despite the popularity of declaring favor for an "all-of-the-above" energy strategy, such a mantra is typically invoked simply as a cover-all in order to push forward an individual's energy priorities without having to engage in inconvenient discussions like practicality, cost, or environmental impacts. And again - this is something which occurs across the board - a token statement given which if the above is any indication, few actually believe (at least with any fervor).

What is perhaps most evident from the above is sharp evidence for the hypothesis that in the political conversation over energy, Americans are talking past one another. Again - given the fact that very little oil is burned directly to produce electricity, most of the conversation on fossil fuels comes down to energy for transportation, with natural gas coming along for the ride in the sense that it may conceivably occupy both sectors. Meanwhile, absent dramatic advances in battery technology, renewables show nearly zero intersection with the transportation sector.

Meanwhile, the lesson in this for advocates of nuclear, both looking at the historic trend in public opinion of oil drilling compared to nuclear energy as well as divisions among party lines is that in order for nuclear to command strong majorities of public support, the issue of ever-rising electricity prices (rising in tandem with global demand for overall energy resources, including coal and natural gas) must be continuously hammered, along with nuclear energy's role in providing affordable, base load electricity. The issue of electricity prices can and does motivate groups - and indeed, sometimes in the wrong way. An example would be the AARP's opposition to Iowa's recent legislative action toward allowing construction-in-progress financing of small modular reactors. The reason? Concerns over electricity prices for those living on fixed incomes. Again, despite the fact that the conclusion is logically perverse in this case, the connection is quite clear.

So what does all of this come down to? Ultimately, it reinforces the issue of fungibility in energy. For nuclear to enjoy the same resilience as fossil fuel sources with public opinion, it must also share the same perception of indispensability. Right now, nuclear is viewed as a fungible energy source - again, one can refer back to the way in which both Republicans and Democrats appear to be making a mental substitution (natural gas or renewables, respectively), thus making nuclear expansion appear to be an "optional" energy strategy for a resource (and carbon)-constrained energy future. Until advocates drive home the essential nature of nuclear energy production with respect to both future energy prices and the environment (i.e., demonstrating that nuclear energy is not so easily substituted without unacceptable economic and environmental trade-offs), it is likely support for nuclear will languish at its historic value near 50%, with sharp and persistent divisions among partisan lines.